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LYNNE L. DALLAS**
In this Article, Professor Lynne L. Dallas examines the cur-
rent system of shareholder voting rights and finds it lacking in
many respects. Professor Dallas presents a historical overview of
the development of shareholder voting rights and concludes that
the current system is a vestige of the nineteenth century. Current
limitations on shareholder voting rights also rest on a weak his-
torical foundation. Professor Dallas contends that, contrary to
common understanding, current laws fall short of providing
shareholders the right to vote on fundamental organic changes
when the economic, operational, control, and legal structures of
a corporation are considered. Professor Dallas proposes two al-
ternative voting systems, the control voting system and the con-
flict of interest voting system, and offers hypothetical examples of
how they would function. Both are based upon her 'power
model," which posits that institutional behavior results from a
contest for control among power coalitions. These innovative sys-
tems promise to be more responsive to the needs of the modern
corporation than does the present, outdated system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The current system of shareholder voting rights is inadequate to
meet the needs of the modem corporation. It is based on the nineteenth
century conception of the corporation as an entity and is founded on a
misinterpretation of express statutory voting provisions. Modem at-
tempts to defend the existing system as requiring voting on fundamental
changes flounder when shareholders do not have voting rights with re-
spect to the economic, operational, control/power, or legal structure of
the corporation.
This Article outlines two voting systems, the control voting system
and conflict of interest voting system. These systems are based on the
power model, which recognizes the conflicting interests and control
struggles within the modem corporation.' These conflicts exist between
managers and shareholders, between controlling and minority sharehold-
ers, and between shareholders and other constituencies, such as
debtholders and employees.2 The tender offers of the 1980s reflected the
dramatic conflicts among these groups. Voting rules, however, proved
largely insensitive to these conflicts. The rules were manipulated easily,
requiring equitable intervention by courts as a last resort.
Voting rules should be revised to address these conflicts, with appro-
priate regard for other methods of' assuring the accountability of manag-
ers, namely judicial oversight and the operation of markets. The decision
to adopt the control or conflict of interest voting system and the precise
content of the system chosen rests with state legislatures, based on their
assessment of the importance of certain control changes and conflicts and
on the value of voting when compared with other methods of assuring
managerial accountability. This article assists such an assessment by
1. See infra text accompanying notes 154-58.
2. For purposes of developing the systems proposed in this Article, this Article assumes,
in keeping with the shareholder-centered focus of corporate law, that only shareholders have
voting rights, with the possible exceptions noted in § V B(3). See infra text accompanying note
297. An examination of how the control and conflict of interest voting systems would work in
a legal context where other constituencies have voting rights would be an interesting undertak-
ing, but is beyond the scope of this article.
3. E.g., infra notes 263-67.
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providing a detailed description of the subjects for voting included in
each system and the required method for voting on such subjects.
Part II of this Article delineates the changing conception of the cor-
poration at the end of the nineteenth century and its effect on share-
holder voting rights, exploring the origin of express statutory provisions
requiring a majority vote of shareholders on fundamental changes and
demonstrating the lack of a solid historical foundation for interpreting
these provisions as limiting shareholder voting rights. Nevertheless, this
Article understands these rights to be in accord with the entity concep-
tion of the corporation. Part II also describes the existing state of share-
holder voting rights, which is essentially a vestige of the nineteenth
century, and presents new voting rights adopted by states and proposed
as a result of the tender offer phenomenon.
Part III challenges the traditional textbook rationale that the ex-
isting voting system (including recently adopted and proposed modifica-
tions) provides shareholders with the right to vote on fundamental or
organic changes in the corporation. Moreover, this section examines and
finds wanting more recent justifications for the existing system of share-
holder voting. Part IV, therefore, explores current conceptions of the
corporation and delineates theoretically the appropriate scope of share-
holder voting for the modem corporation. Finally, Parts V and VI de-
velop the control and conflict of interest voting systems, respectively.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS
A. The History of Voting Rights
Present day shareholder voting rights4 represent the triumph of en-
tity theories over a competing theory, the contract-partnership concep-
tion of the corporation.5 The concerns of the contractualists focused on
4. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, a number of theories of the corpora-
tion vied for recognition. It is unclear whether those theories facilitated doctrinal develop-
ment, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88
W. VA. L. REv. 173, 223 (1985), whether theory and doctrinal development "emerged and
developed more or less simultaneously, each feeding on the other in a dynamic, interdependent
process," see David Millon, Frontiers of Legal Thought L Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201, 204, 242-43, or whether the theory followed doctrinal developments resulting
from economic changes. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm:
Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1511-13 (1989). In any event, these
theories provide a useful means for conceptualizing doctrinal development. The development
of some areas of corporate law, such as the demise of the ultra vires doctrine, can be explained
in the context of the natural entity theory supplanting the artificial entity conception of the
corporation. See Millon, supra, at 212. As shown in this section, however, the triumph of the
natural entity theory over the contract-partnership theory best explains the development of
shareholder voting rights.
5. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 202-07, 214-22; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corpora-
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the concentration of power in a few.6 They viewed the corporation as
similar to a partnership, with the requirement of unanimous approval of
shareholders on fundamental matters, and believed generally that share-
holders were principals and directors were their agents.
By the end of the nineteenth century this view gave way to the con-
ception of the corporation as an independent entity. Consistent with the
evolution of the entity view were three voting developments that resulted
in more centralized control: the replacement of unanimous shareholder
consent for fundamental changes with majority rule,7 the development of
limited shareholder voting rights in favor of exclusive statutory powers in
managers,8 and the disappearance of weighted voting, which limited vot-
ing rights by reference to the number of shares held by an individual
shareholder, to be replaced by one share-one vote.9 These developments
coincided with the changing character of American shareholders, from
individual entrepreneurs to groups of numerous public investors, and the
desire of state legislatures to facilitate corporate development and
growth.10
1. Contract-Partnership Theory
The contractual theory analogized corporations to partnerships.11
Shareholders constituted the corporation; directors of the corporation
tion in American Legal Thought, 76 GEo. L.J. 1593, 1598-99 (1988); Arthur W. Machan, Jr.,
Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REv. 253 (1911) (arguing that a corporation is a natural
entity, but not a person). See generally Note, The Legal Idea of a Corporation, 19 AM. L. REV.
114, 115 (1885) (discussing the premise that a corporation may be viewed as either a person or
as a limited partnership depending on the circumstances). Before the adoption of general en-
abling corporation statutes, the corporation was viewed as an artificial entity because it was
created by special grant of a charter from the crown or state legislature. Horwitz, supra note
4, at 181 (citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (24 Wheat.) 518 (1819)); Note,
supra, at 115.
6. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 204-06, 220; see Jeffrey Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvot-
ing and Limited Voting Common Shares-Their History, Legality, and Validity, 15 SEc. REG.
L.J. 37, 48 (1987).
7. William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and Busi-
ness Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 69, 89; Horwitz, supra note 4, at 203-07; Millon,
supra note 4, at 215; see infra text accompanying notes 21-38.
8. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 214-22; Millon, supra note 4, at 215-16. See infra text ac-
companying notes 21-38.
9. Kerbel, supra note 6, at 49 (citing 2 J. DAvis, EssAYs IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF
AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 323, 324 (1917)). At common law, the rule of per capita voting
applied. Id. at 47. Early state statutes provided for weighted voting. Id. at 48; see infra text
accompanying notes 21-38.
10. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 197-203, 209-10; Millon, supra note 4, at 214-15.
11. E.g., Railway Co. v. Allerton, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 233, 235 (1873); New Orleans, J., &
G. N. R.R. v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517, 537-38 (1854).
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were merely their "agents." 12 Although early charters and state corpora-
tion statutes included management clauses providing that the corpora-
tion's business affairs be conducted by the board of directors,13 the power
of management was nevertheless perceived to be derived from sharehold-
ers. As late as 1886, a leading treatise, in a section titled "Powers of
Directors are Derived from the Shareholders," stated:
The function of the legislature in forming a private corporation
is solely to legalize the agreement of its shareholders; and those
provisions in an act of incorporation which prescribes [sic] ...
the powers of its agents, merely indicate the nature of the asso-
ciation which shareholders are authorized to form.... Every
agent who has authority to represent the collective body of
shareholders must necessarily derive his powers from the con-
sent of the shareholders themselves. 4
Even broadly worded management clauses were viewed as limiting
directorial authority to "ordinary business transactions."' 15 In addition,
such clauses did not appear to deprive the majority of shareholders of
"the power of directing the general policy of the corporation, and of de-
ciding upon the propriety of important changes in the company's
business." 16
12. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 215-16.
13. The charters of many corporations incorporated by special acts of legislatures con-
tained management clauses. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The Modern Corporation, Private Property
And Recent Federal Legislation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 917, 918 (1941). The charters of manufac-
turing firms, however, tended to preserve more powers for shareholders. Id. at 227-28, 236.
Most state general enabling statutes that permitted incorporation by private parties contained
management clauses. Id. at 100. The first general corporation statute in the United States,
enacted in New York in 1811, contained such a clause. Robert A. Kessler, The Statutory
Requirement of A Board of Directors: A Corporate Anachronism, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 696, 703
(1960).
14. VICTOR MoRAwETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 515,
at 482 (1886). To some extent Morawetz's view appears to stem from the idea that sharehold-
ers unanimously consent to a given mode of governance when they join the corporation; a
change in that mode of governance by a majority of the shareholders would fly in the face of
unanimous consent. Id. § 511, at 477; see Horwitz, supra note 4, at 203-04.
15. Allerton, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 233-35; Cass v. Manchester Iron & Steel Co., 9 F. 640,
642-43 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1881); Brown v. Fairmont Gold & Silver Mining Co., 10 Phila. Rept.
32, 33 (1873); see also MORAWETZ, supra note 14, § 512, at 479 (noting that the board has no
"implied authority to make a material and permanent alteration of the business or constitution
of a corporation, even though the alteration be within the company's chartered powers").
16. MORAWETZ, supra note 14, § 511, at 479; see New Orleans, J., & G. N. R.R. v.
Harris, 27 Miss. 517, 537 (1854); Stevens v. Rutland & B. R.R., 29 Vt. 545 (1851). But see
Conro v. Port Henry Iron Co., 12 Barb. 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 1851) (holding that shareholders
could not enter into lease because power to manage was conferred on board of directors, where
lease was for all of the corporation's property and was granted to the majority shareholder);
McCullough v. Moss, 5 Denio 567, 575 (N.Y. 1846) (arguing that if shareholders had author-
ized the president to make a promissory note, which the evidence did not support, the decision
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The majority of shareholders, however, could decide matters only
within the original objectives and purposes of the corporation. Borrow-
ing from partnership law, corporate law required that "fundamental" or
material changes, outside these purposes and objectives, be dependent
upon the unanimous consent of shareholders.17 Such changes included
modifications in the nature or extent of the corporation's business from
that set forth in its charter, a sale of all its assets, a merger or consolida-
tion of its business, or dissolution. 8 A dissenting shareholder could en-
join such a change, even if the legislature and a majority of the
shareholders authorized it. 9 Moreover, courts released a subscriber for
shares from her obligations on her subscription if the corporation did not
obtain her consent for such a change.20
2. Entity Theory
Courts moving away from the contractualist's position refused to
enjoin changes even if shareholders did not unanimously approve them.
They relied on reservation clauses adopted by states and fictionalized the
shareholders' consent.2" For example, courts construed original charters
would not be binding because the management power granted to the board of directors was
exclusive, and incorporators have no right to interfere with it).
17. New Orleans, J., & G. N. R.R., 27 Miss. at 517; see Carney, supra note 7, at 85;
Horwitz, supra note 4, at 200. Professor Dodd argues that the idea that the charter of a
corporation was a contract among shareholders inter sese was undermined by early cases per-
mitting auxiliary, nonfundamental, or incidental changes to be made in the charter by majority
vote of shareholders rather than unanimous consent. According to Professor Dodd, such an
"implied agreement" is an agreement in law, not in fact. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Dissenting
Shareholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 589 (1927); see
Dayton & Cincinnati R.R. v. Hatch, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 501, 507 (1855).
18. E.g., New Orleans, J., & G. N. R.R., 27 Miss. at 527 (involving transfer of all the
corporation's assets); Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578, 583 (N.Y. App. Div.
1861) (involving transfer of portion of corporation's property essential for transaction of its
customary business, and effective dissolution of corporation); Stevens v. Rutland & B. R.R., 29
Vt. 545, 562-63 (1851) (involving an extension of a railroad beyond its originally designated
terminus). But see Beardstown Pearl Button Co. v. Oswald, 130 Ill. App. 290, 294 (1906)
(holding that board of directors has authority, without shareholders' consent, to sell all the
corporation's assets to pay corporate debts).
19. E.g., Stevens, 29 Vt. at 562-63.
20. E.g., McCray v. Junction R.R., 9 Ind. 358, 359 (1857); Middlesex Turnpike Corp. v.
Swan, 10 Mass. 384 (1813); Middlesex Turnpike Corp. v. Locke, 8 Mass. 268 (1811); Union
Locks & Canals v. Towne, 1 N.H. 44 (1817); Hartford & N. H. R.R. v. Croswell, 5 Hill 383
(N.Y. 1843).
21. Miller v. State, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 478, 498 (1872); Venner v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.,
28 F. 581, 590 (C.C.D. Kan. 1886); Durfee v. Old Colony & F. R. R.R., 87 Mass. (5 Allen)
230 (1862). The principle set out in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (24 Wheat.)
518 (1819), that a charter is a contract between the state and the corporation that could not be
altered except by the consent of the parties, id. at 657-62, was quickly replaced by reservation
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to authorize "new and additional enterprises of a nature similar"2 2 to
those included in the charter or not "so foreign to the purposes and scope
of the charter."23 Therefore, unanimous shareholder consent was not re-
quired for the corporation to engage in these new activities. Moreover, in
unpaid subscription cases, courts stated that a "findamental change"
was not void if only a majority of subscribers had agreed to the change.2 4
The courts released nonconsenting subscribers, however, from their
subscriptions.
In Dayton & Cincinnati Railroad v. Hatch,25 the court rejected ex-
plicitly the contractualist position. The court maintained that if the con-
tractualist position were correct, changes not fundamental in nature
would also require unanimous shareholder consent.2 6 Rejecting the no-
tion that a corporation is a partnership, the court held that a corporation
is not based on the agreement of individuals, 27 but rather is an entity, an
"artificial being, having such functions and powers as the law gives it."'28
In holding that directors have the power to accept real estate for
stock, the Dayton court rejected the idea that directors are "agents" of
shareholders.29 Using entity language, the court stated that for certain
purposes directors and shareholders are "members or limbs, each acting
within its appropriate sphere, of that artificial being or entity, to which
name and powers of the corporation have been assigned by the law of its
creation." 0
The power of shareholders thus shifted to the board of directors.
Directors were not agents of the shareholders; their power was consid-
ered "original and undelegated" by shareholders.31 The courts construed
clauses in state statutes that permitted states unilaterally to make contract changes. Dodd,
supra note 17, at 593-600.
22. Durfee, 87 Mass. (5 Allen) at 248.
23. Venner, 28 F. at 589.
24. State v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46 (1861); McCray v. Junction R.R., 9 Ind. 358 (1857).
25. 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 501 (1855).
26. Id. at 507.
27. Id. at 505.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 505-06.
30. Id. at 506. Along similar lines, a New Jersey appellate court held:
[A] corporation is an individual entity or (artificial) person, just as separate and dis-
tinct from the individual persons of its officers, directors, and stockholders as the
latter individuals are from any natural person who is a stranger to the corporation.
The stockholders, single or collectively, are not the corporation; neither are the of-
ficers nor the directors.
Whitfield v. Kern, 120 N.J. Eq. 115, 129, 184 A. 333, 341, rev'd, 122 N.J. Eq. 332, 192 A. 48
(1937).
31. People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 200, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (1911); see also
1992]
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directors' powers granted in management clauses as neither conferred
nor revocable by shareholders.32 Moreover, courts interpreted these
clauses to confer exclusive authority over more corporate decisions to the
board of directors.33
By the late nineteenth century, the unanimous consent requirement
for fundamental changes hindered the expansion of corporations into
other businesses as well as mergers and consolidations.34 State legisla-
tures enacted statutory provisions permitting these changes to be made
with a lesser vote of shares if the board of directors also concurred with
the change. New York adopted one of the earliest of such statutes in
1893; 35 by 1926 virtually all states had adopted similar statutory provi-
sions or reached the same result through court decisions.36 Finally, as
the fear of power residing in a few lessened, weighted voting gave way to
a one share-one vote system. By 1912 most shares carried one vote.37
By the early twentieth century, the entity theory had prevailed, as
reflected in the growth of centralized control. Power over the business
and affairs of the corporation resided clearly in management under man-
agement clauses. Moreover, contrary to their historical roots, explicit
statutory provisions that had been designed to change the common-law
requirement of unanimity to majority rule disenfranchised the majority
of shareholders from deciding all but the changes described by those
provisions.38
The approach under the federal proxy rules which evolved in the
1940s 31 is consistent with this development. These rules permitted share-
holder proposals only on proper subjects for shareholder action under
Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 16, 99 N.E. 138, 141 (1912) (holding that stock-
holders can bring action against corporation when the corporate body has neglected affairs or
refused to act); Hoyt v. Thompson's Ex'rs, 19 N.Y. 207, 216 (1859) (stating that as a private
principal, the board of directors can delegate its authority to agents or committees).
32. Whitfield, 120 N.J. Eq. at 130, 184 A. at 341; Hoyt, 19 N.Y. at 216.
33. Whitfield, 120 N.J. Eq. at 130, 184 A. at 343; Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 322,
119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918); Continental Sec. Co., 206 N.Y. at 16, 99 N.E. at 141; Powell, 201
N.Y. at 197, 94 N.E. at 16.
34. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 200.
35. Id. at 201. Shareholders were often granted appraisal rights if they did not consent to
fundamental changes. In re Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 180, 93 N.E. 522, 523 (1910); Carney,
supra note 7, at 93-96. For a summary of the controversy over why appraisal rights exist, see
Carney, supra note 7, at 75 n.19.
36. Horwitz, supra note 4, at 202.
37. Kerbel, supra note 6, at 49-50.
38. See Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 228 (1962).
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1986); Letter of the Director of the Corporation Finance Divi-
sion Relating to Section 20 and to Rule X-14A-7 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-3638, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [Vol. 3] T 24,102 (Jan. 3, 1945).
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state law.' The rules defined these subjects by reference to voting rights
contained in express statutory provisions, unless the proposals were in
the form of recommendations or requests to management.41 Accord-
ingly, most of the voting facilitated by the federal proxy rules involves
precatory or advisory voting.
3. Conclusion
From this historical account, it becomes apparent that the limita-
tions on shareholder voting rights generally understood to exist under
state law and the federal proxy rules do not rest on a solid historical
foundation. The requirement of unanimous consent for "fundamental"
changes evolved in the context of a contract-partnership conception of
the corporation where partners (or shareholders) voted on all issues by
majority rule, while some issues required unanimous consent. In recog-
nition of the economic needs of corporate development and growth, state
legislatures intended the adoption of express statutory provisions to per-
mit the majority of partners (or shareholders) to determine these issues in
a manner consistent with the jointly held desires of management and the
majority of partners (or shareholders). With the change in the nature of
the shareholders from few entrepreneurs to numerous public sharehold-
ers, these statutes came to limit shareholder voting rights to the subjects
they expressly covered. Management, no longer an agent of sharehold-
ers, gained an independent institutional role. These changes would not
harm the corporation, which was an entity in which the interests of man-
agement and shareholders were aligned in common purpose. Of course,
if the organism were to die (dissolution), change its form (articles
change), or marry (merger), a vote of its owners would be required.
Today, the entity concept has been replaced by conceptions that de-
pict more accurately the complexity and conflicts within the modem cor-
poration. The tender offer phenomenon of the 1980s and the increasing
activism of institutional investors amply demonstrate the conflicts be-
tween management and shareholders, controlling and minority share-
holders, and shareholders and other constituencies such as debtholders
40. The Securities and Exchange Commission early took the view that a corporation vio-
lated its obligation to disclose all material information to its shareholders concerning the
shareholders' meeting if it failed to disclose in its proxy statement information concerning
proposals that the corporation knew would be made by shareholders at the annual meeting.
See Securities and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821,
H.R. 2019 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, 169-70 (1943).
41. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 12,999, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 80,812 (Nov. 22,
1976) [hereinafter Exchange Act Release No. 12,999].
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and employees. Thus, to retain the existing voting system one must find
a reasoned basis for its application to the modem corporation. Before
analyzing the existing system of voting rights, however, one must under-
stand the present state of shareholder voting rights.
B. Traditional, Newly Adopted, and Proposed Voting Rights
As any corporations textbook explains, shareholders, under state
statutes, have the right to vote on "fundamental" changes.42 These
changes consist of mergers,4 3 a sale of substantially all corporate assets, 44
changes in the corporation's articles of incorporation, 45 and dissolu-
tion.46 In most cases management must first initiate and approve these
transactions. The shareholders' rights thus are essentially veto rights,
42. E.g., ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 690-
91 (1989) (citing Elliot J. Weiss, The Law of Takeout Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv 624, 627-30, 641, 648 (1981)); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
3-11 (1983). Professors Lewis D. Solomon, Donald E. Schwartz, and Jeffrey D. Bauman refer
to these changes as "organic." See LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS, LAW AND
POLICY, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 942-43 (2d ed. 1988).
43. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1991);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903(a) (McKinney 1986); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
§ 11.01(a) (1984).
44. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001(a) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a)
(1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909 (McKinney 1986); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT.
§ 12.02 (1984).
45. CAL. CORP. CODE § 902 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1983); N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 803 (McKinney's 1986); REV. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 10.03
(1984). The Revised Model Business Corporation Act permits directors to make certain "rou-
tine and 'housekeeping'" amendments to the articles without a shareholder vote. REv.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 10.02 (1984) (Official Comment); see CAL. CORP CODE
§ 902(d) (West 1990). Some amendments to the articles of incorporation and bylaws may be
prohibited on public policy grounds. Burns v. Wray Fanner Grain Co., 65 Colo. 425, 428-29,
176 P. 487, 488 (1918); State ex reL Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 A. 257, 259 (Del.
1926); Taylor v. Groswold, 14 N.J.L. 222, 228 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1834); Costello v. Thomas Cu-
sack Co., 96 N.J. Eq. 83, 88, 124 A. 615, 617 (Ch. 1922); Audenreid v. East Coast Milling Co.,
68 N.J. Eq. 450, 467, 59 A. 577, 584 (Ch. 1904); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112,
117, 60 N.E. 2d 829, 830 (1945); In re Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 518,
186 N.Y.S. 430, 431 (lst Dep't.), aff'd mem., 231 N.Y. 615, 132 N.E. 910 (1921); Blatchford
v. Ross, 54 Barb. 42, 45, 37 How. Prac. 110, 112, 5 Abb. Prac. (N.S.) 434, 436 (1869); Hauser
v. York Water Co., 278 Pa. 387, 392, 123 A. 330, 331 (1924); Commonwealth ex rel. Wilde v.
Pennsylvania Silk Co., 267 Pa. 331, 332, 110 A. 157, 157 (1920); HENRY W. BALLANTINE, ON
CORPORATIONS 63 (1946); WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 4186, 4191 (1992).
46. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-084 (1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-45-2
(Burns 1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 293-A: 85 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-3 (Michie
1983); REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT. § 14.02 (1984). Some states permit shareholders
to dissolve a corporation without any action by the corporation's board of directors. E.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(c) (1991) (unanimous consent required); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1900 (West 1990) (50% consent required); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1986)
(two-thirds consent required).
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and hereinafter will be referred to as "shareholder veto rights." Share-
holders also have the right to elect47 and remove48 directors and in most
cases change the corporation's bylaws,4 9 without initiation or approval
by management.
The federal proxy rules are also relevant to shareholder voting.
These rules are applicable to public companies ° and require disclosure
to shareholders of material information on subjects to be voted on at
annual meetings."1 Consistent with the disclosure objective of the proxy
47. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301(a) (West 1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 703(a) (McKinney
1986); REv. MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 803(d) (1984).
48. CAL. CORP. CODE § 303(a) (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1983);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 706 (McKinney 1986); REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.08
(1984). For the inherent right of shareholders to remove directors for cause, see Campbell v.
Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 572, 134 A.2d 852, 857 (1957) and Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y.
427, 432, 118 N.E. 2d 590, 593 (1954).
49. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (1983);
REv. MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 10.20 (1984). Bylaws are important to control of the
corporation. They can determine the rules for calling and conducting shareholders' and direc-
tors' meetings, the number and qualifications of directors, and the establishment of board com-
mittees. In addition, they may contain provisions of particular interest to management
concerning indemnification or exculpatory clauses with respect to liability. At common law,
shareholders had the sole authority to amend the bylaws, unless that power was delegated by
them to directors. FLETCHER, supra note 45, §§ 4172, 4178. Shareholders could delegate such
power to directors in the corporation's articles. State statutes were enacted that permitted
directors to amend bylaws, without an articles provision to that effect. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-
2A-45 (1991); CAL. CORP. CODE § 211 (West 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 2.25
(Smith-Hurd 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-49 (1991); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 2.23 (West 1991); WASH. R v. CODE ANN. § 23 B.02.020(3)(ii) (West 1992). Some
of these statutes attempted to reverse the common law rule by placing primary authority in
directors to amend the bylaws, unless the authority to amend the bylaws was reserved to share-
holders in the articles. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:27 (1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 47-2-49 (1991); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-17 (1991); FLETCHER, supra note 45, § 4172.
But some courts have found that shareholders have the inherent power to amend bylaws re-
gardless of statutory authority. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 588 (1933); Auer, 306 N.Y. at
433, 118 N.E. 2d at 594 (1954). Bylaw amendments may be prohibited on public policy
grounds. See supra note 45. Most state statutes provide that directors may amend bylaws, at
least if that right is set forth in the corporation's articles or bylaws. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 211 (West 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 2.25 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IVIAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 156B, § 17 (West Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-20 (1990); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 601(a) (McKinney 1986). Certain limitations are contained in corporation stat-
utes concerning amendment of bylaws by directors. For example, under the California statute,
directors cannot amend the bylaws to change a fixed number of directors, to change the maxi-
mum or minimum number of directors, or to change from a fixed to a variable board or vice
versa. CAL. CORP. CODE § 212 (West 1990).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 (1988). Corporations with securities listed on a national stock
exchange or corporations in interstate commerce with both total assets of five million dollars
and a class of equity securities held of record by more than five hundred shareholders are
required to register any class of equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a) & (g) (1987); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.12g-1 (1992).
51. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 14a-101 (1989).
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rules, shareholders may include their own proposals in the company's
proxy statement, provided that they comply with procedural rules 2 and
that their proposals do not fall within the exclusions of Rule 14a-8.13
As noted above, proposals not resting on explicit statutory provi-
sions authorizing shareholder voting must be in the form of recommen-
dations or requests to the corporation's board of directors. Important
among those proposals that may be excluded, even if only advisory, are
proposals that deal with the ordinary business of the corporation,5
4
which is often interpreted very broadly;"5 that relate to election to of-
52. Id. § 240.14a-8(a).
53. Id. § 240.14a-8(c).
54. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(7). The SEC, in response to questions raised by the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, explained the rationale of the ordinary business exclusion as
follows:
The policy motivating the Commission in adopting the rule... is basically the same
as the underlying policy of most State corporation laws to confine the solution of
ordinary business problems to the board of directors and place such problems beyond
the competence and direction of the shareholders. The basic reason for this policy is
that it is manifestly impracticable in most cases for stockholders to decide manage-
ment problems at corporate meetings.
Hearing on SEC Enforcement Problems Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 118 (1957).
In response to criticism that the ordinary business exclusion was being relied on to ex-
clude proposals of considerable importance to corporations and its shareholders, Exchange
Act Release No. 12,999, supra note 41, at % 80,812, a criticism shared by the court in Medical
Committee for Human Rights, 432 F.2d. 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S.
403 (1972), the Commission in 1976 proposed to modify this exclusion to exclude "routine
day-to-day matters relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer."
Proposed Amendments to the 1934 Act Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange
Act Release No. 12,598, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,634 (July 7,
1976). The Commission suggested that a reasonable standard to distinguish between routine
and important business matters was "whether it would be necessary for the board of directors
to act on the matter involved in the proposal." Id. at 86,599. The Commission ultimately did
not adopt the proposal, probably due to substantial criticism mostly from corporate commen-
tators. Exchange Act Release No. 12,999, supra note 41, at 87,130. The Commission stated
that it rejected this standard because the boards of different companies delegate different
amounts of authority to officers and because it could find no satisfactory standard for distin-
guishing between routine and important business matters. Id. at 87,131. The Commission
resolved, however, to be more "flexible" in its application of the exclusion than in the past. Id.
It would not permit the exclusion of matters "which have significant policy, economic or other
implications inherent in them." Id. However, matters that are "mundane in nature and do
not involve any substantial policy or other considerations" would be omitted under the exclu-
sion. IaL
55. See infra notes 60-64. In addition, no-action letters have been issued for advisory
proposals raising significant policy issues such as abortion. Hospital Corporation of America,
SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 12, 1986, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding
excludable a proposal concerning medical procedures to be performed at hospital). But see
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 7, 1991, available in WESTLAW,
FSEC-NAL database (holding not excludable a proposal that the company refrain from mak-
ing charitable contributions to organizations that support, counsel, or perform abortions). No
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action letters have also been issued for proposals involving use of watershed land, Pennsylvania
Enterprise, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Apr. 12, 1985, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL
database; use of Indian burial sites, Gulf Oil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 4, 1980,
available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database; offshore drilling, Exxon Corporation, SEC
No-Action Letter, Jan. 18, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding ex-
cludable a proposal to suspend all future activities in pursuit of new offshore leases for oil
exploration and development in federal and state waters); sale of pornography, USX Corpora-
tion, SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 26, 1990, available in WESTLAW, PSEC-NAL database
(holding excludable a proposal to cease sale of adult soft-core pornography at its retail outlets);
and advertising standards, General Mills, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 20, 1990, available
in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (finding excludable a proposal prohibiting company
from advertising programs that encourage homosexuality or pornography); Bell South Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 11, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding
excludable a proposal relating to corporate advertising ethics policy); General Electric Com-
pany, SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 30, 1989, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database
(holding excludable a proposal relating to re-establishing a unit to create broadcasting and
advertising standards including specific prohibitions on such matters as sex and violence). But
see American Brands, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 28, 1991, available in WESTLAW,
FSEC-NAL database (holding not excludable a proposal relating to establishing committee to
report on company adherence to voluntary code of cigarette advertising).
The staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission appears to have recently revised its
policy. It now permits management to omit shareholder proposals that request information on
equal opportunity and affirmative action programs. Compare Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, Apr. 10, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excluda-
ble a proposal requesting the company to report information on company equal employment
and affirmative action to shareholders and suppliers) with Dayton Hudson Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, Mar. 8, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (stating that the
same proposal is includable). Also compare Capital Cities ABC, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
Apr. 4, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable under Rule
14a-8(c)(7) a shareholder proposal regarding affirmative action because it dealt with matters
relating to company's ordinary business operations) with CBS, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
Mar. 7, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding that exclusion was not
permitted).
In addition, decisions have recently been made to revise several former policies. The staff
of the Securities and Exchange Commission now permits shareholder proposals that relate to
plant closings, Pacific Telesis Group, SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 2, 1989, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database; and production of tobacco products. Loews Corporation,
SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 22, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding
includable a proposal to amend the company's articles of incorporation to provide that the
company shall not conduct any business in tobacco or tobacco products); Kimberly-Clark
Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 22, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database
(holding includable a proposal to require board to take actions leading to the eventual cessa-
tion of the manufacture of tobacco products); Philip Morris Companies, SEC No-Action Let-
ter, Feb. 13, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding includable 'a
proposal to amend the company's articles of incorporation to provide that the company shall
not conduct any business in tobacco or tobacco products); American Brands, Inc., SEC No-
Action Letter, Feb. 28, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding includ-
able a proposal to establish a committee to report on cigarette advertisements and policies to
ensure compliance with the voluntary code of cigarette advertising). But see Philip Morris
Companies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 22, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL
database (holding excludable a proposal that company provide a report on its lobbying activi-
ties and expenditures to influence legislation regarding cigarette advertising, smoking in public
places, and exploiting foreign markets). The Commission also recently has announced its in-
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fice;56 that counter proposals submitted by the corporation;5 7 and that
tention to permit shareholders to make proposals on all forms of compensation to senior exec-
utives and directors. Press Conference with Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman
Richard Breeden, Fed. News Service (Feb. 13, 1992). This announcement was made in re-
sponse to proposed legislation introduced in the House and Senate to permit shareholders to
submit proposals on executive and director compensation policies. H.R. 2522, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1992); S. 1198, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). The Commission had previously permitted
proposals only on golden parachute payments. Ryder Systems Inc., SEC No-Action Letter,
Mar. 6, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding includable a proposal
requesting the company to refrain from awarding golden parachutes to executives unless share-
holders approve); Eastman Kodak, SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 22, 1990, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding includable a proposal to adopt a policy prohibit-
ing the company from making compensation payments to its directors, officers, or employees
contingent on a merger or acquisition).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1987). The Commission has consistently maintained
that Rule 14a-8 may not be used by shareholders to nominate or recommend board members.
It has maintained this position despite its recognition that:
For the vast majority of shareholders, an election contest is not feasible because of
the huge expenses involved. Although shareholders may be permitted to make nomi-
nations from the floor at annual meetings, it is clear that this right is of little practical
value, since at that point proxies have already been received by management for
nominees which it has chosen, and the number of shareholders attending an annual
meeting typically is insignificant.
Reexamination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation
in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 13,482 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,130 (Apr. 28, 1977).
See Reexamination of Rules Relating to Shareholders Communications, Shareholders Partici-
pation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange
Act Release No. 13,901 [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 81,296 (Aug. 29,
1977). In 1978, the Commission began focusing on the importance of nominating committees.
Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the
Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No.
14,970 [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,645 (July 18, 1978). After hear-
ings, the Commission staff issued a report recommending that "[i]f there is not a substantial
increase in the percentage of companies with independent nominating committees who con-
sider shareholder nominations, the Commission should authorize the staff to develop a rule to
require companies to adopt a procedure for considering shareholder nominations." SECURI-
TIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH CONG., 2D. SEss., STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILrrY 131 (Comm. Print 1980). After monitoring the number of companies with
nominating committees in connection with its three-year (1979-81) Proxy Disclosure Monitor-
ing Program, the staff decided not to recommend such a rule. By 1981, however, fewer than a
third of the companies in its sample had nominating committees (an increase from 19.4% in
1979), and only 78% of these committees considered shareholder nominees (a decrease from
the percentage that did so in 1979). Analysis of Results of 1981 Proxy Statement Disclosure
Monitoring Program, Exchange Act Release No. 18,532, [Vol. 3] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
24,120 (Mar. 3, 1982).
A possible indication that the Commission is shifting toward a more liberal approach may
be signaled by its refusal to give a no-action letter for a recent proposal recommending that a
corporation's board institute a mechanism for the nomination of opposition directors. Chit-
tenden Corp., SEC No-Action letter, Mar. 10, 1989, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL
database. But see Thermo Electron, SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 22, 1990, available in
LEXIS, FEDSEC library, NOACT file (finding excludable under Rule 13a-8(c)(8) a share-
holder proposal recommending the board provide equal opportunities for nomination of oppo-
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sition directors); American Telephone & Telegraph Company, SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 11,
1991, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC library, NOACT file Securities (finding excludable under
Rule 14a-8(c)(8) a shareholder proposal recommending that two nominees for the board of
directors be selected by the unions representing the company's employees). The Commission
appears also to be adopting a more liberal position on shareholder debate on management
proposals. Compare Mobil Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 19, 1988, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (finding includable a shareholder proposal recommending
that certain shareholders have the right to make opposition statements to management's pro-
posals in the corporation's proxy statement) with Detroit Edison Co., SEC No-Action Letter,
Feb. 12, 1980, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (finding excludable a proposal
for fair and equal debate on proposals in the corporation's proxy statement). Proposals that
are deemed to question the business judgment, competence, or service of directors are consid-
ered to relate to the reelection of directors and thus are excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8).
E.g., Time-Warner, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC
library, NOACT file (holding excludable a shareholder proposal to censure board of directors
for not accepting bid of $200 per share from Paramount); UAL Corporation, SEC No-Action
Letter, Jan. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC library, NOACT file (holding excludable a
shareholder proposal admonishing the board of directors for its decisions).
The Commission continues to permit the exclusion of recommendations of specific nomi-
nees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1988); see, e.g., City Fed Financial Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, May 17, 1991, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC library, NOACT file (holding excludable
three proposals nominating individuals for office); Unocal Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb.
8, 1991, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC library, NOACT file (holding excludable a proposal
recommending inclusion of names of nominees for Directors in proxy statements). In addi-
tion, it sanctions the omission of proposals that recommend that a certain number or percent-
age of directors have certain qualifications. See American Telephone & Telegraph Company,
SEC No-Action Letter Jan. 11, 1991, supra; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, May 9, 1985, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable under
Rule 14a-8(c) a shareholder recommendation that the board of directors nominate at least one
active employee, selected by participants in the company's profit-sharing or employee stock
plan); Allied Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 5, 1984, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC li-
brary, NOACT file (holding excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8) a proposal that one member of
the board be a non-management salaried employee); Braniff International Corp., SEC No-
Action Letter, Feb. 5, 1982, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excluda-
ble under Rule 14a-8(c)(8) a proposed amendment of bylaws that board of directors nominate
at least four active employee shareholders, selected by designated employee groups), because
the proposal would require that "employees from certain specified employee groups be in-
cluded in management's slate of nominees"). But see Waste Management, Inc., SEC No-Ac-
tion Letter, Mar. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC library, NOACT file (holding not
excludable a proposed amendment of bylaws to provide that a majority of the board of direc-
tors be independent); Dillard Department Stores, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 7, 1991,
available in LEXIS, FEDSEC library, NOACT file (holding not excludable a proposed amend-
ment of bylaws to provide that a majority of the board of directors be independent); see also
infra note 74 (showing that a shareholder can avoid exclusion by wording the proposal prop-
erly). Any proposals on the qualifications of directors must apply to all directors. E.g., Do-
minion Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, FEDSEC
library, NOACT file (holding not excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8) a proposal recommending
that each director be required to own at least 2,000 shares of Company stock); Unicare Serv-
ices, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, May 13, 1980, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL
database (holding not excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8) a proposal that no director be an
officer, director, or principal stockholder of any supplier or customer doing more than $20,000
business with the company). But see Quaker State Corp., No-Action Letter, Mar. 17, 1988,
available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding not excludable a proposal that only
outside directors must own a certain amount of common shares). Proposed legislation intro-
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involve specific amounts of cash or stock dividends.5" Management can
omit important subjects under these exclusions. For example, under the
ordinary business exclusion, management may omit proposals that raise
significant policy issues,59 that require the corporation to provide addi-
tional financial information," that prohibit loans by the corporation to
officers,6" or that require the corporation to report to shareholders on
ordinary business matters.62 In addition, while shareholders routinely
vote at annual meetings on auditors, they cannot, under the ordinary
duced in the House and Senate would permit large shareholders to nominate directors. H.R.
2522, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991); S. 1198, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(9) (1987).
58. Id. § 240.14a-8(c)(13). Instrument Systems Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter,
Nov. 12, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal
requesting company declare a dividend to all common stockholders of an option to purchase a
share of common stock for every four shares); Shop Television Network, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, May 20, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a
proposal requesting company, in the event of an early termination compensation payment, to
distribute 75% of the payment to stockholders); National Affiliated Corporation, SEC No-
Action Letter, Mar. 28, 1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding exclud-
able a proposal requesting that the company pay a cash dividend of 25 to 50 cents per share to
all shareholders).
59. See supra note 55.
60. E.g., Ashland Oil Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Nov. 2, 1990, available in WESTLAW,
FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal requesting information on the company's
legal and advertising costs); Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 30,
1986, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal request-
ing current cost financial statements to determine fair market value of shares); Arizona Public
Service Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 22, 1985, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL
database (holding excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(1) a proposal requesting corporate financial
disclosure as improper subject for action by security holders, and also excludable under Rule
14a-8(c)(7) as dealing with matters relating to conduct of ordinary business operations); Pitts-
burgh & West Virginia Railroad, SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 19, 1984, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal requesting appraisal or re-
evaluation of company properties for purposes of establishing current market value of shares);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Dec. 12, 1979, available in WESTLAW,
FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal that financial statements reflect effects of
inflation).
61. E.g., Ferrofluidics Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Aug. 16, 1991, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal to prohibit the company
from lending money or guaranteeing loans to any officer, director, employee, or consultant to
the company); Major Realty Corp., SEC No-Action letter, Mar. 19, 1987, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal not to make loans to officers
and directors).
62. Eg., Pepsico Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 7, 1991, available in WESTLAW,
FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal requesting a report evaluating the impact
of several health care programs on the company and its competitive position); International
Business Machines Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 14, 1991, available in WESTLAW,
FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal requesting an explanation concerning
company actions respecting a particular contract); Carolina Power & Light Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, Mar. 8, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excluda-
ble a proposal requesting a report on aspects of the company's nuclear operations); see supra
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business exclusion, suggest other auditors63 or even recommend that au-
ditors be rotated from time to time.64
As a practical matter, moreover, management retains substantial
control over the proxy machinery; this dominance can interfere with the
meaningful participation of shareholders in the corporate governance of
public companies. Although shareholders have the right to elect direc-
tors, the federal proxy rules do not permit shareholders to nominate
them for inclusion in the corporation's proxy statement. 5 To make a
nomination shareholders must engage in an expensive proxy contest. 6
They often must litigate to obtain a shareholder list67 and employ a
proxy soliciting firm. Even if successful in having their nominee elected,
they are not entitled to reimbursement of their costs. 68 Management, on
the other hand, has the advantages. It can utilize corporate funds, has
note 55 (no-action letters permitting the omission of proposals requesting a report on the com-
pany's equal opportunity and affirmative action proposals).
63. S.S. Kresge Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 17, 1976, available in WESTLAW,
FSEC-NAL database; Kellogg Company, SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 23, 1976, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database; Pay Less Drug Store, SEC No-Action Letter, Apr. 11,
1975, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database.
64. E.g., Southern New England Communications Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 11,
1991, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal to limit
service of any independent audit firm to five consecutive years and six years in any ten consec-
utive years); Pacific Gas & Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 18, 1991, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal for new accounting firm
every four years); Bank of America Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 27, 1986, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal requesting that no in-
dependent public accounting firm be recommended by the auditing and examining committee
for more than five consecutive years); Long Island Lighting Co., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb.
20, 1986, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding excludable a proposal re-
questing, among other things, that no independent public accounting firm be recommended by
the audit committee for more than seven consecutive years); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
SEC No-Action letter, Nov. 25, 1980, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (holding
excludable a proposal requesting company to consider rotating outside auditors).
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) (1992).
66. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 112 (1976).
67. Regulation of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No. 29,315,
[1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 1 84,811 (June 17, 1991 [hereinafter Ex-
change Act Release No. 29,315]. Although shareholders can obtain a shareholder list or have
their materials sent to shareholders by the corporation at their expense, the election among
these alternatives is in the hands of management under Rule 14a-7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14A-7
(1992). Management generally elects to mail the material giving it substantial control over the
"timing and effectiveness" of the shareholders' communications. Exchange Act Release No.
29,315, supra, $ 84,811, at 81,853 n.63; see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexam-
ined, 89 MICH. L. Rv. 520, 542 (1990) [hereinafter, Black, Shareholder Passivity] (referring to
Rule 14a-7 as a "nonaccess" rule). Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission pro-
posed revisions to Rule 14a-7 permitting shareholders to elect to receive a shareholder list
which would also include more information than under the current Rule. Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 29,315, supra, 84,811.
68. EISENBERG, supra note 66, at 122 n.88.
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ready access to shareholder lists, reviews proxies as they come in en-
abling its resolicitation of adverse votes,69 and controls the agenda,70 tim-
ing, location, and conduct of annual meetings.7 1 Moreover, management
often has considerable influence over large shareholders due to its ability
to provide these shareholders with corporate business. 72
The shareholder proposal rules are also very technical, 73 often re-
quiring the shareholder proponent to hire legal counsel. The shareholder
must word the proposal properly to avoid exclusion.7 4 Numerous exclu-
69. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 542.
70. Id. at 592-94; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control. The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. Rv. 1277, 1277-93 (1991) (arguing that mana-
gerial manipulation of proxy agenda inhibits shareholder activism).
71. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT
ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILrrY 138-88 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter SEC ACCOUNTA-
BILITY REPORT].
72. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 595-608; Coffee, supra note 70, at 1321;
Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialisr Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 117,
147 (1988); Mark J. Roe, .4 Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 10, 54 (1991).
73. See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating
to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 20,091 [1983-84 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCI-) 1 83,417, at 86,206-07 (Aug. 16, 1983) (Commissioner Longstreth's
dissent).
74. The complexity of the Rule is illustrated by the following:
Assume that a shareholder submits a proposal that "a nonmanagement shareholder
be elected to the board of directors at the upcoming meeting." This proposal would
be excludable under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) [hereinafter Rule 14a-8(c)(8)],
which permits the omission of proposals "relating to the election to office," since the
proposal applies to the upcoming meeting. Allied Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan.
5, 1984, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database. If revised to apply only to
subsequent meetings, it would nevertheless be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(6), be-
cause the proposal is worded such that it is beyond the power of the corporation to
effectuate. Management cannot "elect" a nonmanagement shareholder to the board;
it can only "nominate" candidates, who in turn must be elected by shareholders.
American Information Technologies Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Dec. 13, 1985,
available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database (proposal that at least one elected
member of the board of directors be a worker-shareholder or retired employee omit-
ted); GTE Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Jan. 10, 1984, WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL
database (proposal that a number of women should be elected to the board of direc-
tors excluded). Then, if the shareholder amends the proposal to provide that "a
nonmanagement shareholder be nominated to the board," the proposal may be ex-
cludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(1), as the proposal is not phrased as a recommendation
or request. Northwest Airlines, SEC No-Action Letter, Mar. 2, 1978, WESTLAW,
FSEC-NAL database. The SEC, however, would probably point out this error to the
shareholder and permit her to amend the proposal. Even so reworded, the proposal
may be excludable under Rule 14a-8(c)(8), as it is deemed to relate to the nomination
of persons from a "specific group." See supra note 56. That is, it does not involve
establishing a general qualification for all of the directors. The shareholder can es-
cape this result only by proposing that all nominees be non-management sharehold-
ers, see supra note 56, or possibly by proposing that the board of directors consider
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sions exist, precluding shareholders from exercising a voice on a number
of important issues. 75 Moreover, management can include an opposing
statement of any length in the corporation's proxy statement, whereas
shareholders' proposals and supporting statements cannot exceed 500
words.76
As a result of the tender offer phenomenon, some states have
adopted new provisions relating to shareholder voting rights.77 Control
share acquisition provisions require a vote of minority shareholders
before a shareholder either can acquire78 or vote79 shares that are consid-
ered "control shares."8 0 In addition, a number of states have adopted
statutory provisions relating to major transactions in which controlling
shareholders have an interest. The statutes prohibit such transactions for
a number of years ("business combination" statutes)" or should a fair
price not be provided ("fair price" statutes), 2 unless the corporation ob-
tains a supermajority vote or vote of disinterested shareholders.
nominees selected by a committee composed of nonmanagement shareholders. See
Bank America Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Feb. 7,1980, WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL
database (proposal that the company facilitate organization of institutional investor
committees and consider a list of nominees from such group not excludable under
Rule 14a-8(c)(8)).
Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Menas, 22 U. MICH.
S.L. REF. 19, 85-86 n.257 (1988) (citation format updated).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1992); see Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at
542.
77. Control share acquisition statutes require a majority vote of disinterested shares
before a person can acquire or vote control shares as defined in the statutes. E.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.0902 (West Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West Supp. 1990); MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 110D, §§ 1 to 13 (West Supp. 1991); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302a.671
(Vest Supp. 1991); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1990); see also Model State
Control Share Act 3d (Public Discussion Draft, dated March 29, 1988) (requiring such a ma-
jority vote of disinterested shares). For a detailed discussion of this Act, see Evan M. Kjel-
lenberg, The Model Control Share Act is the Best State Takeover Law Alternative, 8 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. 329, 342 (1988).
78. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin Supp. 1992).
79. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0902 (West Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9
(Bums Supp. 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110D, §§ 2, 5 (West 1990); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.671(4a) (West Supp. 1991).
80. Control shares are generally defined as shares that result in a person having voting
power that is equal to or greater than certain thresholds (20%, 33 1/2%, and 50%). See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 607.0902(1) (West Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (Burns Supp.
1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671(2)(d) (West Supp. 1991).
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43-18 (Burns
Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302 A.673 (West Supp. 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:10A-4 (West Supp. 1991); N.Y. Bus. CORp. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp.
1991).
82. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-374a to 374d (West 1987 & Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 607.0901 (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
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Congressional legislators and the SEC Advisory Committee have
also proposed shareholder voting rights on a number of subjects concern-
ing managers who may be inclined to act against the interests of share-
holders in order to retain control of the corporation or seek control of
another corporation. These proposals advocate shareholder veto rights
on poison pills,83 greenmail,84 the issuance of specified percentages of
voting stock, 5 golden parachutes,86 shark repellents, 7 lock-ups,8 8 and
the decision of the corporation to commence a tender offer.89 Advisory
shareholder voting rights have also been proposed for golden
parachutes,9" certain kinds of standstill agreements, 91 supermajority vot-
ing provisions, 92 and disenfranchisement provisions that provide for a
departure from the one share-one vote principle.93
III. THE RATIONALE FOR VETO RIGHTS UNDER STATE LAW
The existing system of shareholder veto rights rests on the assump-
tion that shareholders have control over "fundamental" or "organic"
changes. This section will demonstrate that the current system of voting
rights under state law does not rest on such a coherent conceptual frame-
work. This is true even if one considers the newly adopted and proposed
voting rights inspired by the tender offer phenomenon.
A. The Lack of Veto Rights Over Fundamental or Organic Changes
The terms "fundamental" and "organic" do not distinguish between
1991); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to 603 (Supp. 1991); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 450.1776-1784 (West 1990).
83. S. 1658, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1244, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 678,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 2172, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
84. SEC ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS
46 [hereinafter SEC ADVISORY REPORT]; S. 1658, S. 1244, S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); S. 521, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 227, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 78, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 2668, H.R. 2172, H.R. 1601, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
85. SEC ADVIsoRY REPORT, supra note 84, at 44; H.R. 2668; H.R. 2172, 100th Cong,,
1st Sess. (1987).
86. S. 1658; S. 1244; H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
87. SEC ADVISORY REPORT, supra note 84, at 36-37; id. at 86 (separate statement of
Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jerrell); S. 678; H.R. 2668; H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st.
Sess. (1987).
88. H.R. 2668; H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1987).
89. SEC ADVIsORY REPORT, supra note 84, at 130 (separate statement of Arthur J.
Goldberg).
90. Id. at 38-41.
91. d at 38.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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subjects over which shareholders do and do not have veto rights. The
Random House College Dictionary defines "fundamental" as "being an
essential part of, a foundation or basis" 94 and "organic" as "of or per-
taining to the constitution or structure of a thing."'95 When one applies
these definitions to the corporation, it becomes apparent that "fundamen-
tal" or "organic" may refer to the economic, operational, control/power,
or legal structure of a corporation. This section examines these
structures.
1. Economic Structure
Because shareholders are investors, their perspective of fundamental
change often focuses on changes in the economic structure of the corpo-
ration. Commonly understood, the corporation's balance sheet, namely
its capitalization, reflects the economic structure of the corporation. De-
cisions affecting a corporation's capitalization involve the issuance or re-
purchase of shares, issuance or retirement of debt, and issuance of
dividends or retention of earnings.
Of these decisions, shareholders have only limited veto rights with
respect to the issuance of shares. In addition, these rights exist only
when the corporation's articles96 have not previously authorized the
shares to be issued (it is commonplace to authorize large numbers of
shares in advance) or when a corporation listed on the New York Stock
Exchange increases its outstanding shares by twenty percent or more.97
Veto rights have been proposed for a company's issuance of a certain
percentage of its voting shares98 and for the repurchase of shares from a
potential bidder (greenmail).9 9 However, neither shareholder veto rights
nor proposals for such rights exist for the issuance or retirement of
debt,"° the issuance of dividends or retention of earnings, or the repur-
chase of stock from other than potential bidders. The federal proxy rules
prohibit even advisory voting on these subjects due to the ordinary busi-
94. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 535 (rev. ed. 1975).
95. Id. at 936.
96. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
97. THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURrrIEs REGULATION, § 11.1
n.16 (2d ed. Supp. 1992); Interview with Thomas L. Hazen, Professor of Law, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, N.C. (Aug. 24, 1992).
98. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
100. Legislation has been proposed, however, for limiting the debt financing of tender of-
fers. S. 1324, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 11(a) (1987) (prohibiting takeovers that are more than
25% debt financed); S. 634, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1987) (restricting junk bond financ-
ing). Cf. H.R. 2995, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1987) (denying any deduction for interest
incurred in connection with a hostile stock purchase).
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ness °10 and dividend exclusions.10 2
Shareholders do not have veto rights over fundamental changes even
if one defines economic structure differently. For example, one may de-
scribe structure by reference to the nature of the corporation's business.
A decision to make a drastic change in the business, however, such as
through the acquisition of the assets of another corporation for non-stock
consideration (thus avoiding merger veto rights) 0 3 or the reinvestment
of earnings in a new business, does not require a shareholder vote. One
may also define economic structure by reference to a corporation's long-
term relationships and commitments. Shareholders do not have a veto
right, however, over long-term leases or long-term agreements, such as
those with labor or principal suppliers.
In essence, shareholders do not have veto rights over changes in eco-
nomic structure. While they have veto rights over mergers, sales of sub-
stantially all corporate assets, and dissolutions that have a substantial
impact on economic structure, they have no veto rights over other
changes, such as debt levels, asset purchases, and stock repurchases, that
may have the same or greater impact on that structure.
2. Operational Structure
Shareholders also do not have veto rights over changes in the opera-
tional structure of the corporation. Changes in this structure involve
changes in production, from the procurement of raw materials to manu-
facturing to the distribution of final products. Decisions concerning this
structure entail the formation of departments, divisions, and subsidiaries,
and the allocation of work among them. None of these decisions, which
also represent changes in "economic" structure, require a shareholder
vote.
3. Control/Power Structure
Additionally, shareholders have no veto rights over various changes
in the control/power structure. One may define control structure in for-
mal terms by reference to the corporation's organizational chart describ-
ing the hierarchy within the firm. As discussed earlier, however,
shareholders do not have veto rights over many changes that can affect
this organization of authority within the firm. One may also define con-
trol structure by reference to rules determining the authority of directors,
controlling shareholders, and minority shareholders. Although share-
101. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
103. See infra text accompanying notes 231-34.
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holders have voting rights on articles"° and bylaw amendments,10 5 the
directors' independent authority over bylaw changes can result in a
change of control without the shareholders' consent.10 6 In addition, at
least one group of shareholders, minority shareholders, often do not have
authority to prevent changes in articles or bylaws that affect them ad-
versely. Subjects on which shareholders have veto rights under the ex-
isting system, such as various article amendments and the sale of
substantially all corporate assets, do not involve changes in the control
structure.
Control structure may also concern the number of shares outstand-
ing and any agreements among owners of such shares. Shareholders
have veto rights over the number of shares authorized in the articles and
may enter into a number of agreements, such as voting trusts and voting
agreements. A corporation, however, may sell substantially all its assets,
have a corporation merge into it, dissolve, or amend its articles without
affecting the control structure so defined, Le., the shares authorized or
shareholder agreements. Thus, these shareholder veto rights cannot be
rationalized by a change in this control structure. Similarly, when the
control structure is defined differently by reference to the substantive
terms of various long-term agreements, 107 shareholder veto rights are not
explained by changes in that control structure.
Note that shareholders have veto rights over nonstructural control
changes such as the identity of directors0 8 and, in some states, control-
ling persons.10 9 However, as discussed above under "economic struc-
ture," they do not have veto rights over other nonstructural control
changes through stock issuances and repurchases. They also do not have
authority over popular defensive tactics such as the issuance of stock to
friendly pension funds or white knights. Moreover, a board of directors
can effectuate a de facto merger, resulting in a change of control without
a shareholder vote in many states, by issuing voting stock for the assets of
another corporation. 1 Thus, shareholder veto rights do not grant
104. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
106. See infra text accompanying note 263.
107. Of course, the actual control or power structure of the corporation may differ from
the structures so defined due to traditional rules and the corporation's dependence on various
resources at different times. Dallas, supra note 74, at 80-84.
108. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
110. A purchase of assets does not require a shareholder vote and an issuance of shares
would not require a shareholder vote if the shares were already authorized in the corporation's
articles of incorporation. Some state courts will not utilize the de facto merger doctrine. E.g.,
Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 74, 76-77, 188 A.2d 123, 125 (1963).
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shareholder voting rights for either structural or nonstructural control
changes.
4. Legal Structure
If one defines the legal structure of the corporation narrowly by ref-
erence to the contents of the corporation's articles and bylaws, share-
holders have effective veto rights over changes in the corporation's legal
structure. This definition explains veto rights over mergers, because
most mergers on which shareholders have veto rights require amend-
ments to articles.111 In addition, this category includes dissolution be-
cause dissolution results in a termination of the corporation's legal status.
The sale of substantially all the corporation's assets, however, does
not necessarily involve a change in the legal structure of the corporation.
One should note also that shareholders do not have veto rights over
changes in legal structure, if one defines that structure more broadly to
include such subjects as forming subsidiaries or entering into long-term
agreements.
5. Conclusion
The terms "fundamental" and "organic" are not used properly to
distinguish subjects on which shareholders do and do not have veto
rights. One cannot fully describe shareholder veto rights by reference to
the economic, operational, or control structure of the corporation.
Shareholders do have veto rights over changes in legal structure if that
structure involves only the corporation's articles and bylaws. Neverthe-
less, if one accepts this definition of legal structure, it does not explain
veto rights with respect to a sale of substantially all corporate assets and
express provisions granting shareholders veto rights over mergers, when
a provision providing the right to vote on amendments to the articles
would be sufficient.
B. Explanations of Shareholder Veto Rights
This subsection explores recent explanations of shareholder veto
rights by important legal scholars. It also discusses explanations of ap-
praisal rights because so-called fundamental changes often trigger these
rights.
Dean Manning, in his influential 1961 article on appraisal rights,
argued that existing shareholder veto rights on fundamental changes re-
111. See SOLOMON et al., supra note 42, at 942.
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late to changes in legal structure.' 12 He noted that mergers, dissolutions,
or article amendments cause trauma to the corporate "entity,""' 3 result-
ing in its "assassination,"" ' 4 "death,""'  or the "amputating, or grafting
on, [of] a limb,"' " 6 respectively. Arguing that shareholder rights are not
based on changes in economic structure, he demonstrated that a person
could not effectively distinguish among events for which shareholders
had appraisal rights from a list of other possible transactions of equal or
greater economic significance to the corporation for which shareholders
had neither voting nor appraisal rights." 7 He opposed the extension of
appraisal rights to transactions that were functionally equivalent to
mergers, 118 but, expressing his dissatisfaction with the existing system of
appraisal rights, advocated that legal scholars undertake a complete re-
evaluation and reworking of the system on a functional economic
basis.' 19
Professor Eisenberg, in his influential book The Structure of the Cor-
poration, rejected Manning's claim that veto rights over "fundamental"
changes involved transactions of legal rather than economic "structural"
significance.' 20 Professor Eisenberg emphasized the word "structure,"''
which encompassed decisions affecting the "control apparatus" and the
"structure of the business."' 22 The "control apparatus" consisted of
ground rules for control, such as cumulative voting and the election and
removal of directors.'23 Although he did not define decisions affecting
the "structure of the business," he distinguished these decisions from
other business decisions involving matters outside the ordinary course of
business by asking whether making these decisions required "invest-
112. Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72
YALE L. 223 (1962). Dean Manning maintained that functional economic explanations of
"fundamental" changes are bound to fail, because they impose a twentieth century conception
of the corporation as a commercial enterprise on a scheme for appraisal rights that is the
product of the early nineteenth century legal mind. Id. at 244-57.
113. According to Dean Manning, the early nineteenth century legal mind viewed the cor-
poration "as something quite separate from the economic enterprise, three dimensional, virtu-
ally alive, a little bit sacred." Id at 245.
114. Id. at 246.
115. Id. at 245, 250.
116. Id. at 251.
117. Id. at 241-44.
118. Id. at 257-60.
119. Id. at 260-62.
120. EiSENBERG, supra note 66, at 75-77.
121. Id. at 15-16.
122. Id. at 16.
123. Id.
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ment" skills or "business" skills.124 Mergers and dissolutions required a
shareholder vote because the skills required to make such decisions were
similar to the skills needed to determine whether to "invest" in the busi-
ness. 25 Professor Eisenberg considered these skills different from the
"business" skills needed to make other decisions for the corporation that
were outside the ordinary course of business.
While Professor Eisenberg did not argue for the limitation of share-
holder voting rights to structural decisions in all cases,126 he distin-
guished this class of decisions from all others based on "shareholder
expectations" when decisions require different skills. 27 To the extent the
law did not provide for appraisal rights for all types of economically sig-
nificant structural changes, Professor Eisenberg suggested that it was not
because appraisal rights rested on legal significance, but because legisla-
tures had been remiss in keeping abreast of the different types of modem
corporate transactions.1 28 Unlike Dean Manning, Professor Eisenberg
suggested statutory modifications to provide appraisal rights for transac-
tions functionally equivalent to mergers.1 29
Professor Eisenberg's thoughtful response to Dean Manning is un-
persuasive, however, when he distinguishes "structural" decisions from
other business decisions that are also outside the ordinary course of busi-
ness or, stated differently, when he indicates that the word "structural" is
more useful than the terms "fundamental," "major," or "extraordinary"
to explain shareholder veto rights. 3 ' First, this Article's analysis of the
term "structure" demonstrates that "structure" does not distinguish be-
tween or identify those transactions over which shareholders do and do
not have veto rights. This is true even if legislatures adopt the statutory
modifications proposed by Professor Eisenberg to extend those rights to
functionally equivalent transactions. Second, defining structural deci-
sions by reference to investment or business skills also does not distin-
guish among such transactions. Investment skills are involved when a
shareholder decides to invest in a corporation because of its policies with
124. Id. at 14-16.
125. Id. at 15. Professor Eisenberg explained:
[TMhe skills involved in formulating a decision to merge with Corporation B or to
liquidate Corporation B are similar to the skills involved in formulating a decision to
invest in Corporation B, and are quite different from the skills needed to formulate an
advertising campaign, conduct employee relations, or make steel.
Id.
126. Id. at 16, 68.
127. Id. at 12-16.
128. Id. at 75-76.
129. Id. at 249-50.
130. Id. at 16.
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regard to such matters as leverage, dividends, and the nature of the cor-
poration's business, matters over which shareholders have no veto rights.
In addition, it is incorrect to characterize the decisions Professor Eisen-
berg attributes to managers as involving only business skills. Investment
skills are also necessary to make important decisions concerning such
matters as advertising, employee relations, and steel production.
Unlike Professor Eisenberg, Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, in
a frequently cited 1983 article on voting rights,131 did not focus on differ-
ing skills or "structure" to explain shareholder veto rights, but assumed
that such rights are explained by the possibility of large gain or loss be-
cause of the size of a transaction. 132 For large transactions, shareholders
have an incentive to overcome collective action problems. 13 3 Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel expressed concern about the lack of expertise of
"passive financial investors" to make "major business decisions," but
concluded that shareholder veto rights are presumably efficient because
of their durability and uniformity across state statutes.134
The incentive-residual rights theory 35 served as the foundation for
the arguments of Professors Easterbrook and Fischel. This theory rea-
sons that since shareholders have the greatest risk of loss among corpo-
rate constituencies, they are entitled to vote. It follows that the greater
the risk to shareholders (the size of the transaction is only one indicator
of risk), the more important voting becomes to them. Unfortunately,
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel did not compare the economic signif-
icance of transactions that require a shareholder vote and those that do
not. 136 For example, shareholders do not have the right to vote on the
acquisition of substantial assets or the issuance of excessive debt. Profes-
sors Easterbrook and Fischel also did not explain why shareholders have
the right to vote on some amendments to corporate articles and bylaws
that do not involve the possibility of large gain or loss to shareholders.
In addition, for reasons explored elsewhere, 37 also suspect is their evolu-
tionary argument concerning the presumptive efficiency of existing share-
holder veto rights.
In the context of a discussion of the de facto merger doctrine, Pro-
13 1. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting].
132. Id. at 416.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Dallas, supra note 74, at 53-63.
136. This may be the case because Professors Easterbrook and Fischel do not acknowledge
the prior debate on this subject. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 131, at 397-98.
137. Dallas, supra note 74, at 46-48.
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fessor Gilson asserted in 1986 that the difficulties encountered by Dean
Manning and Professor Eisenberg in explaining shareholder veto rights
resulted from their narrow view of "corporate structure."13 Professor
Gilson maintained that "corporate structure" consists of the "interplay
of statutory, judicial and market elements." '39 According to Professor
Gilson, one should reference this structure, particularly market forces, to
answer the question whether events that raise similar economic risks
should be treated the same legally. 1" For example, shareholders of an
acquiring corporation do not need appraisal rights, whereas shareholders
of a selling corporation do, because management of the selling corpora-
tion will not be subject to the discipline of markets after the transaction
(a final period problem).141
138. RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISITIONs 577-78
(1986).
139. Id. at 577. Professor Gilson also makes this point in Ronald . Gilson, The Case
Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34
STAN. L. REv. 775, 821-22 (1982) [hereinafter Gilson, Shark Repellent]; Ronald J. Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REv. 819, 848 (1981) [hereinafter Gilson, A Structural Approach].
140. GILSoN, supra note 138, at 579.
141. Id at 578-79. Professor Gilson also applies his analysis to explain why changes of
control through tender offers should have different legal consequences (such as voting require-
ments) from changes of control through mergers and sales of substantially all corporate assets.
His argument is based on the proposition that product, capital, and managerial markets mostly
deal with managerial inefficiency, leaving the market for corporate control to discipline self-
dealing. Gilson, A StructuralApproach, supra note 139, at 839-40. If these other markets do
not adequately discipline self dealing, the argument goes, the market for corporate control
should be left largely unrestricted to do so. Id. at 846-48. Thus, changes of control through
tender offers should be treated differently from changes of control in other ways. According to
Professor Gilson, shareholder "autonomy" or individual decision making with respect to exit
decisions should be the structural principle allocating roles in tender offers. Id. at 875-76.
This argument rests on the premise that markets deal differently with self-dealing and manage-
rial efficiency. According to Professor Gilson, "[i]ncentives to succeed in the product market
are less likely to constrain managerial self-dealing, since what is of concern is management's
ability to allocate to itself income generated through successful operation of the corporation's
business." Id. at 839. As for capital markets, he claims that, although stock prices will be
adversely affected by self-dealing, managers can finance business activities with retained earn-
ings and debt. Id. Moreover, the managerial service market will not negatively view self-
dealing, because the buyers in that market are also managers. Id. He further notes that, un-
like managerial inefficiencies, self-dealing cannot be negated by diversification because it al-
ways favors managers. Id. at 839-40. Finally, the importance of the market for corporate
control is stressed due to the inadequacy of judicial remedies for self-dealing transactions. Id.
at 840.
While some of these arguments have initial appeal, they become less persuasive on closer
examination. An increase in the cost of operations will impact on competitive ability in the
product and capital markets, regardless of whether the source is inefficiency or self-dealing.
An increase in costs will decrease retained earnings that could have been used for reinvestment
in the operations of the corporation's business. Less profitability can impact on the corpora-
tion's ability to raise capital not only in the equity markets but in debt markets as well. In
addition, the outside managerial market is dependent for the assessment of managerial per-
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Professor Gilson's use of the overused and not highly explanatory
term "structure" 42 as an integral part of his analysis is unfortunate. His
attempt to explain shareholder appraisal rights by reference to the ade-
quacy of judicial remedies or market forces is a valid hypothesis,
although it does not provide an explanation for existing rules. Gilson
explains the difference in appraisal rights between shareholders of the
acquiring and selling corporations on the basis of whether management
will or will not be subject to market forces after the transaction. In a sale
of assets transaction, however, the final period problem arises for share-
holders of the acquiring corporation when the consideration for the as-
sets is a controlling block of stock, but appraisal rights are unavailable to
them. Such analysis also does not explain the lack of appraisal rights for
shareholders of the selling corporation when the consideration for the
assets is cash. 143  For many transactions, moreover, appraisal rights are
available for shareholders of both constituent corporations irrespective of
which one management ultimately controls.'" Explaining voting rights
on the basis of the final period problem (or the absence of market disci-
pline) also would not encompass shareholder veto rights for amendments
to articles and bylaws. Professor Gilson's attempt to explain existing ap-
praisal rights by reference to the final period problem does not have ex-
planatory value. Nonetheless, a sensitivity to the interplay of statutory,
judicial, and market forces assists conceptually in determining the appro-
formance on stock prices which Professor Gilson acknowledges will be adversely affected by
self-dealing. Id at 838 n.72. Moreover, if self-dealing cannot be negated by diversification
neither can managerial efficiency because, from the perspective of shareholders, whether the
loss is frittered away, never made, or ends up in managers' pockets is immaterial. In addition,
if the risk of mismanagement is systematic as has been suggested, John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?:
Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53
BROOK. L. REv. 919, 945-46 (1988), the risk cannot be negated by diversification. While the
judicial remedy for self-dealing may be unsatisfactory, the judicial remedy for inefficiency (the
business judgment rule) is more so. Finally, self-dealing and managerial inefficiency cannot be
so readily separated because inefficiency may reflect other values of management. Although
Professor Gilson recognizes this last point, he uses it only to demonstrate the inadequacy of
the judicial remedy, Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 139, at 840, but it also under-
mines his market analysis.
If one were to accept Professor Gilson's argument that product, capital, and managerial
markets do not deal well with self-dealing as opposed to managerial inefficiency, such an argu-
ment could support the conflict of interest voting system here proposed. The voting system
proposed in this Article, however, is not based on this market analysis. It is based on the
behavioral analysis that managers have additional incentives to misread exit messages and to
approve transactions when their personal interests are thereby furthered.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 94-111.
143. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-080.A.2 (1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 910(a)(1)(B) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992); REv. MODEL BusNEss CORP. AcT
§ 13.02(a)(3) (1984). Net proceeds of the sale must be distributed to shareholders within one
year from the date of sale.
144. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (c) (1991).
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priate sphere of voting rights, as will be discussed in Part IV of this Arti-
cle. The focus on conflicts of interest present in the final period is also
important and is developed more extensively in Part VI.
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, shareholder veto rights
are not based on a coherent system in which shareholders have the right
to vote on fundamental or structural changes, variously defined. The
next section of this Article explores modem conceptions of the corpora-
tion in connection with their significance for defining the subjects on
which shareholders should have voting rights. Part IV develops the
scope of shareholder voting rights under the power model by analyzing
the value of voting by comparison with other methods for assuring ac-
countability among shareholders, such as judicial action and market dis-
cipline. Parts V and VI discuss the proposed control and conflict of
interest voting systems in detail.
IV. A THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING OF VOTING IN THE
CORPORATE SYSTEM
A. Modern Conceptions of the Corporation
Although corporate law scholars have long since abandoned the
conception of the corporation as an entity, the current state voting
scheme can still be traced to this concept. 145 Two modem conceptions of
the corporation demand attention: the power coalition theory146 and the
"nexus of contract" or market theory.1 47 Each has potentially different
implications for shareholder voting. These new conceptions coincide
with the changing perceptions of the corporation and the realities of to-
day's corporate world.
The nexus of contract theory (or market theory) views the corpora-
tion as a nexus of contracting relations among individuals for whom
management acts as agent.'4 Proponents of this theory generally favor
145. During the 1930s, the corporation was reconceptualized as an "aggregation of its
shareholders for whom management acted as trustee." Millon, supra note 4, at 203. This
theory was the predecessor to the more modem nexus of contract theory. Id.
146. Dallas, supra note 74, at 25; Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (And
Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REv. 273, 314-17 (1991).
147. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 778 (1972); Hazen, supra note 146, at 284-87; Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. & EON. 305, 310 (1976); Symposium, Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989).
148. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 147, at 778; Lucian A. Bebehuk, The Debate on Con-
tractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1395, 1397 n.8 (1989); Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 147, at 310; Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the
Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1530, 1534 n.13 (1989).
[Vol. 71
CORPORATE LAW
permitting shareholders wide latitude in determining rules of internal
corporate governance on a firm-by-firm basis. 4 9 These rules evolve as
markets influence managers to put in place optimal governance struc-
tures. Private, rather than governmental rules, such as the federal proxy
rules, govern the corporation.15 0 Corporate law under this theory serves
as a standard form contract or set of default rules that the parties can
modify freely.' For example, shareholders may vote even to relieve di-
rectors of their fiduciary obligations.
Contrary to this description, some contractualists argue that certain
legal rules cannot be modified by the parties, particularly after the corpo-
ration has shareholders. 1 2 Such conclusions follow even if the corpora-
tion's charter provides for such amendments. These arguments,
however, do not support the conception of the corporation as a "nexus of
contract"; rather, they demonstrate that this theory may not provide an
accurate description of the corporation. Contracting does not occur ef-
fectively if, as these writers contend in justifying some mandatory legal
rules, management controls the proxy machinery and parties are unin-
formed, rationally apathetic, and unable to price provisions
accurately. 153
The power coalition theory depicts the corporation as an institution
whose behavior results from a contest for control among power coali-
tions which are comprised of groups of individuals.' 54 This theory is
based not on private contracting, but on power relationships resulting
from social, cultural, political, legal, and economic developments.155 The
group or groups that emerge as dominant determine the institution's be-
havior.'56 The dominance of a group depends not on its stake or the
nature of the group's interest in the firm, but rather on the firm's per-
149. Bebchuk, supra note 148, at 1396 n.7; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1418 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel,
Corporate Contract]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 13 1, at 398; McChesney, supra
note 148, at 1536-37.
150. Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 131, at 418-26.
151. Bebchuk, supra note 148, at 1397; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Contract, supra
note 149, at 1444-46; McChesney, supra note 148, at 1535-37.
152. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance In Corporate Law: An Essay on
The Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. RPv. 1618, 1674-76 (1989); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1574-85 (1989). For argu-
ments for mandatory rules for the publicly-held corporation, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1461, 1471-1515 (1989).
153. See supra note 152.
154. Dallas, supra note 74, at 30-31.
155. Id. at 26, 83-84, 97-99.
156. Id. at 31, 41-42.
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ceived dependence on the group and the resources it provides. 157 The
firm tends to act so as to decrease its uncertainty (or dependencies) by
increasing its autonomy and discretion over its environment."18 Corpo-
rate strategies for dealing with dependencies are numerous. Contracting
is only one such method. Cooptation, which describes the shareholders'
relationship with the corporation, is another.
Cooptation is "the process of absorbing new elements into the lead-
ership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of
averting threats to its stability or existence."' 9 Shareholders are coopted
or induced to invest in the corporation to assure its creation or continu-
ance, and, in return, they assume a special role in the governance of the
corporation. This participatory role can be effective or real (informal
cooptation), 1  or largely illusory (formal cooptation),161 in which case
the participatory role may serve merely to legitimize managerial power
to some relevant audience.1 62
Shareholder participation in corporate governance began in small
corporations as a recognition of the firm's dependence on the resources
provided by capital investors. As the public corporation grew less depen-
dent on shareholders for capital, the importance of shareholders to the
corporation became largely to establish legitimacy. 163 Basically, to avoid
governmental interference with managerial discretion, the corporation
needed to be perceived as private property with private owners in con-
trol.164 That managers have considered voting merely a legitimating tool
157. Id. at 71-72, 82-84.
158. Id. at 30-31, 82-83.
159. PHILIP SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASSROOTS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
FORMAL ORGANIZATION 13 (1966); JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION 35
(1967).
160. Dallas, supra note 74, at 92-93 & nn.281-88.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 92 n.282.
[W]hen the legitimacy payoff is with a broader audience than the coopted group, the
audience is "less likely to critically examine the meaningfulness of expanded partici-
pation." This is especially true in the case of shareholder participation in which the
public at large [rather than the shareholders] is the relevant audience.
Id. at 96 (quoting MICHAEL G. LACY, COOPTATION: ANALYSIS OF A NEGLECTED SOCIAL
PROCESS 73 (1977)).
163. Id. at 93-94.
164. I have previously noted that:
This legitimation derives from three sources. The first source resides in the Ameri-
can respect for private property. Shareholders are generally perceived by the public
to be "owners" of the corporation and, therefore, ultimately in control of its activi-
ties. Managers, thus, can argue persuasively against governmental interference by
relying for legitimacy on arguments relating to the private control of property. The
second source of legitimacy rests on the efficiency argument-made by the residual
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is evidenced by their desire to avoid real shareholder voting control by
proposing dual class capitalizations (placing nonvoting common stock in
public hands)16 and even lobbying state legislatures for provisions that
shareholders might not approve. 166 These strategies, however, have un-
dermined the legitimacy of the system, resulting in reexamination of cor-
porate governance in the 1990s.' 6 7
With the increased activities of corporate raiders and institutional
investors, managers found that cooptation is a "two-edged sword."'' 6 A
legitimating device such as voting that brings a group into the policy-
making structure of an organization has the potential to provide a real or
effective means of participation. For example, despite substantial obsta-
cles to shareholder participation,169 institutional investors have become
increasingly active. This development has been documented extensively
elsewhere and, therefore, will not be reviewed here'70 other than to note
that increased institutional holdings by certain kinds of institutions (such
as public pension funds) have resulted in the transformation of a formal
cooptative situation into an informal one.
rights theorists-that owners have the greatest incentive to utilize corporate re-
sources efficiently, which redounds to the benefit of society. A mechanism for owner
participation in decision making thus provides a social reason for combating interfer-
ence by government in managerial decision making. The third source of legitimacy is
the comfort obtained from a system of "checks and balances"-fundamental to the
American understanding of justice-whereby managers are perceived to be checked
by shareholder participation. It is generally considered beneficial for those holding
positions of power to be held accountable to some group or groups other than them-
selves. That management is purportedly held accountable to shareholders serves to
legitimate its exercise of power. Shareholder participation has thus provided the ide-
ological justification for managerial power. Such a justification is particularly impor-
tant for the large corporation because of the scope of its control over decisions
affecting the community at large.
Id. at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
165. Gordon, supra note 152, at 1563, 1577-79.
166. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. I11,
129-31 (1987) (arguing that managers have lobbied for provisions in state takeover statutes
that shareholders would not approve if subject to their vote).
167. This was the focus of the recent meeting of the Business Section at the Annual Meet-
ing of the Association of American Law Schools held in San Antonio, Texas (Jan. 3-7, 1992),
and is reflected in a number of recent law review articles. Eg., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN.
L. REv. 863 (1991); Martin Lipton & Stephen A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. Rav. 187 (1991).
168. Dallas, supra note 74, at 96 & n.302.
169. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 530-66, 595-607; Conard, supra note 72,
at 146-63; Roe, supra note 72, at 17-31.
170. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 570-75; Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8,
Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REv. 97, 157-63
(1988).
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B. The Appropriate Scope of Shareholder Voting Rights
Both the power coalition and nexus of contract theories differ from
the entity theory in that they highlight conflicting interests within the
firm. Although voting on "fundamental" changes by a majority of share-
holders is compatible with the .entity theory, a more complex voting sys-
tem that focuses on control and conflict of interest transactions is
arguably more consistent with these new conceptions of the corporation.
Conflicts and control struggles within the firm exist on a large scale
in the modem corporate world. Examples include conflicts between
managers and shareholders, between controlling and minority sharehold-
ers, and between shareholders and other constituencies, such as
debtholders and employees. While these conflicts have always been la-
tent, tender offers and buy-outs have brought them into stark relief. In
addition, the increased activism of institutional investors17 reveals that
these investors perceive important conflicts between managers and share-
holders; they are increasingly unwilling to trust that managers will act in
their best interests.
Although the nexus of contract theory focuses on conflicting inter-
ests, often referred to as "agency costs, ' 172 the voting systems proposed
in this Article are not fully compatible with that theory. The proposed
systems require a set of rules which govern control and conflict of inter-
est situations that cannot be changed by the parties. In contrast, the
nexus of contract theory permits the parties to make any change in rules.
Markets impacting on managers determine the appropriate legal rules.
Some contract theorists may argue that because substantial market pres-
sures are necessary to force managers to develop rules that are contrary
to their more direct interests, the control or conflict of interest voting
system proposed in this Article should be adopted. The systems address
special situations where the market fails, and, thus, legal intervention is
indicated. These arguments, however, merely illuminate the limitations
of the contractualist's theory.
The focus on control and conflict of interest situations is fully con-
sistent with the power coalition theory. The legal system focuses logi-
cally on changes of power within the enterprise and instances where one
party seeks to advance his or her own interest at the expense of another.
The systems of voting proposed in this Article are designed to prevent
171. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 570-75.
172. Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1427 n.61 (1985); Robert C. Clark, Agency Cost Versus Fiduciary Du-
ties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 77 (John W. Pratt &
Richard Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
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overreaching and to assure a degree of accountability for any group seek-
ing changes that serve its interests.
In addition, consistent with the focus on power relationships, impor-
tance is assigned to different methods, referred to as spheres of accounta-
bility, for assuring that those in power act responsibly: voting, markets,
and judicial action. This article posits that each of these spheres should
operate separately without undue encroachment by the others because
each has unique advantages and disadvantages. The three spheres oper-
ating independently provide a system of checks and balances. As this
country's founders correctly observed, accountability can be served by
three branches of government operating in the same terrain but differ-
ently. "Free contracting," which, for example, would permit opting out
of fiduciary duties, pays too little attention to this political system of
checks and balances in the corporate governance system.
The next section assesses the value of voting as a decision-making
mechanism compared to other spheres' effectiveness in assuring account-
ability. One should note that the systems of voting proposed in this Arti-
cle will not necessarily expand shareholder voting rights, but will change
the situations which require a shareholder vote and the kind of vote that
is appropriate. This discussion will be followed in Parts V and VI with a
detailed delineation of the proposed voting systems, the control and con-
flict of interest voting systems.
1. Voice and Exit as Decision-Making Mechanisms
Market theorists have focused their criticisms of voting as a deci-
sion-making mechanism on collective action and free rider problems.173
Many argue that small shareholders are rationally apathetic about vot-
ing. Because of their small investments and inability to obtain reim-
bursement from the corporation or other shareholders for their costs of
becoming more active, they lack the incentive to develop the expertise,
spend the time, or incur the costs to vote and participate intelligently in
corporate governance. Nevertheless, voting would appear to be superior
to managerial fiat in control and conflict of interest situations, and also
might provide benefits not attainable by relying on markets. Some have
criticized markets, for example, as the sole source of optimal governance
arrangements. 174
173. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 131, at 402-03; Bernard S. Black,
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rlv. 811,
821 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching Agents]; see also Coffee, supra note 70, at 1317-
28 (listing extra-legal causes of shareholder passivity).
174. E.g., Dallas, supra note 74, at 59-62, 66-68; Eisenberg, supra note 152, at 1488-1514.
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At the heart of the collective action problem is shareholder apathy.
It should be stressed, however, that apathy is an important part of any
political system because it contributes to stability.1 75 That apathy can
quickly change to activism when conditions warrant it demonstrates am-
ply the value of the limited voting rights that shareholders possess. The
recent activity of institutional investors and institutional investor associa-
tions176 demonstrates that this change to activism can occur in the corpo-
rate governance area. This activism is particularly significant because it
has occurred despite limited voting rights, 17 7 managerial control of the
proxy machinery,1 78 and the conflict of interest of certain institutional
investors.1 79 Had the federal proxy mechanism been disbanded, these
institutional investors and associations would have lacked an important
access route to influence managerial behavior.
Also, focusing on the apathy of shareholders draws attention away
from the effect of voting rights on managerial behavior. The value of
voting, in part, reflects the effect that access and disclosure, or the threat
thereof, have on managerial decisions. Even advisory voting confronts
managers with the reality that their decisions may be brought to the at-
tention of shareholders and subjected to their scrutiny. The appearance
of rubber stamp voting does not diminish the importance of voting.180
Managers often consult large shareholders in advance181 and are unlikely
to propose transactions that shareholders will not approve.182 Moreover,
focusing solely on shareholders' proposals that have been submitted to a
vote effectively neglects those proposals withdrawn by shareholders be-
cause management agrees to their implementation."8 3
With respect to the lack of incentive shareholders have to develop
expertise, shareholders with voting rights are able to determine whether
to decide an issue themselves or to defer to management. By voting
against a shareholder proposal, or not voting at all, they defer to manage-
175. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 14 (1970).
176. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 65-72.
179. See Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 595-608; Coffee, supra note 70, at
1321; Conard, supra note 72, at 146-48; Roe, supra note 72, at 54.
180. Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L, REV. 1635,
1683 (1988).
181. Id.
182. Id.; Ryan, supra note 170, at 177 & n.32.
183. See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 173, at 847-48. But see George W.
Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8. A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 21-22
(1985) (arguing that shareholder proposals that are not passed rarely prompt change); Susan
W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425, 450-52
(1984) (same).
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ment. Opponents of shareholder proposals are fearful that shareholders
will vote in favor of an action that would, if decided by directors, result
in directors breaching their fiduciary obligations. This fear is not well
founded, i"4 however, mainly because of the broad discretion given to di-
rectors under the business judgment rule. Nevertheless, courts or legisla-
tures could address such a concern by providing a standard of directorial
conduct in situations where corporate action has been directed by share-
holders. In this way, the directors also would remain responsible for cor-
porate actions.185 A proposed standard would require directors to
implement a shareholder resolution when, in their business judgment, a
reasonably prudent director could adopt it.'8 6
In addition, the increasing participation by institutional investors af-
fects informed voting positively. Shareholders have formed associations
to provide information to institutional investors on voting matters.18 7 A
critical mass of institutional investors may now exist who can influence
corporate governance.188  In the past shareholders arguably may have
been inclined to become more informed when selling shares than when
voting those shares. The force of this argument is diminished by the size
184. No-action letter files are replete with letters from management arguing under the ordi-
nary business exclusion that a shareholder's proposal might force directors to breach their
fiduciary duty because the proposals may not, in the judgment of the directors, be in the best
interest of the corporation. E.g., Shareholder Proposal of Dirk W. Van De Graaf, Letter of
Gaston & Snow, Mar. 7, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database; Baltimore Gas
& Electric Co., Letter of David A. Brune, Feb. 6, 1990, available in WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL
database; American Brands, Inc., Letter of Chadbourne & Park, Feb. 22, 1990, available in
WESTLAW, FSEC-NAL database. Similarly, early cases involving the enforceability of share-
holders' agreements were concerned that constraining managerial discretion by enforcing the
terms of such agreements would threaten directors' independence, and lead to breaches of their
fiduciary duties to act in the best interest of the corporation. West v. Camden, 135 U.S. 507,
514, 520, 523 (1890); Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 602, 75 A. 568, 573 (1910); Creed v.
Copps, 152 A. 369, 370 (Vt. 1930); 1 F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.20, at 91-92 (3d. ed. 1987).
185. The directors should remain responsible for the activities of the corporation, particu-
larly when it is a publicly-held corporation. The shift in control through a shareholders' direc-
tive is not so dramatic as a provision in the articles of incorporation of a closely-held
corporation providing that the corporation shall be managed by shareholders rather than by a
board of directors. In such cases, shareholders are subject to the liability of directors. E.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351 (1991). By providing for the exercise of judgment by directors
of a shareholders' directive under the standard of review proposed, responsibility remains
properly centralized in management.
186. The business judgment rule can be applied in the absence of evidence of self-dealing.
The case would explore whether the directors who decided to implement the shareholder's
resolution were grossly uninformed and had no rational basis for believing that a reasonably
prudent director could have adopted the course of action directed by shareholders. The busi-
ness judgment rule is discussed in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
187. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 573; Conard, supra note 72, at 143-44.
188. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 524, 567-70.
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of institutional holdings i"9 and economies of scale190 in proposing resolu-
tions to a number of companies. As for the capabilities of institutional
investors, these institutional investors are the same investors on whom
market theorists rely to provide informed markets.
The above discussion does not deny the importance of collective ac-
tion problems. Indeed, they are important, as are legal impediments to
shareholder voting 1 ' and conflict of interest problems.192 Nevertheless,
voting is at least an equally valuable method of assuring managerial ac-
countability when compared to exit, as the following discussion will fur-
ther demonstrate.
In the economic arena, a bias exists in favor of exit over voting or
voice. 93 Critics view voice in the realm of the political and as disruptive
and inefficient.' 94 Even those recognizing the value of voice often per-
ceive its value only when the market fails. To the contrary, as the first
point below demonstrates, it is valuable to ensure a corporation's respon-
siveness to shareholders even when the market prices shares accurately.
In addition, voice may be under-utilized when it is more efficient than
exit in encouraging such responsiveness.
In the economic arena, arguments concerning the superiority of exit
to voice have been confined largely to consumer goods; the same argu-
ments, however, do not necessarily apply to stock. For example, some
have claimed exit shows preferences more directly than voice. Market
choices are perceived to be finer and more articulate. 195 While this argu-
ment may be somewhat persuasive with respect to simpler products-
although even here exit does not convey whether the dissatisfaction is
with price, quality in performance, or aesthetics-the message given to
management through selling or not buying more complex products is un-
clear. The ambiguity of the message is particularly severe with respect to
stock, which reflects an investment in a vast enterprise.
An economist might respond that the message simply is that the
189. Id.
190. Id. at 524, 580-84.
191. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
192. Black, Shareholder Passivity, supra note 67, at 595-608; Conard, supra note 72, at 139-
52.
193. HIESCHMAN, supra note 175, at 16-17; Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division
of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1671, 1673 (1985).
194. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 175, at 17; Dent, supra note 183, at 14-16; Liebeler, supra
note 183, at 438-39, 454.
195. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 175, at 17; James M. Buchanan, Individual Choice in Voting
and the Market, 62 J. POL. ECON. 334, 341 (1954). But see ROBERT A. DAHL & CHARLES E.
LINDBLOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE 422-27 (1976) (noting the "shortcomings
of market choice" and "the badly calculated choices of individuals in the market").
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shareholder is dissatisfied with the expected return on her investment; by
the mere act of selling, the shareholder does not convey her assessment of
the manner in which the company has erred. Management may misread
her assessment in the absence of voice. This misreading may be particu-
larly likely with respect to control matters or to matters involving a man-
agerial conflict of interest, such as a corporation's adoption of a large
golden parachute contract for senior executives. Moreover, management
may not discern the shareholder's social responsibility messages, such as
dissatisfaction with a company's business in South Africa, its treatment
of minorities, or the effect of its business practices on the environment.
So, as the product purchased becomes more complex, the message
given to management through exit becomes less precise. Voting is an
alternative to exit permitting a direct and more articulate expression of
preferences. The value of voting in this regard exists regardless of the
market's ability to price shares accurately.
Commentators praise exit as being less coercive than voting and
more responsive to individual and differentiated concerns. 196 A person
can, as an individual, choose whether or not to exit; a majority vote,
however, will bind the minority as well. Exit therefore is viewed as con-
sistent with the normative principle of shareholder autonomy.197 When
one takes into account the ambiguity of the message provided by exit,
however, voting provides shareholders the opportunity for a wider range
of expression. A system that encourages activities desired by some per-
sons inevitably will restrict the choice of others. This result follows
whether exit or voice drives the system.
One can argue that while voting provides a wider range of choices
with respect to the policies and activities of a particular corporation, exit
provides a wider range of choices among corporations. Primary reliance
on exit encourages persons to migrate to corporations with policies they
prefer; different persons will migrate to different corporations. The ma-
jority voting construct does not give persons holding majority views the
incentive to exit; rather they will impose their views on corporations
through voting. All corporations eventually will reflect the same general
views; shareholders with less widely held views will not find compatible
corporations in which to invest.
Two problems arise with this argument, aside from its debatable as-
sumption concerning efficient markets. First, exit is an imperfect mecha-
nism for the expression of approval or dissent on a wide range of issues.
196. Buchanan, supra note 195, at 339.
197. Cf Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 139, at 869 (preferring shareholder au-
tonomy in tender offers).
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Shareholders may choose one corporation over another because they pre-
fer on balance the policies of that corporation. This choice means that
they may actually prefer some policies of the corporation from which
they exit. Exit does not provide a means for shareholders to endorse the
positive policies of the corporation they leave or to disapprove those poli-
cies of the corporation in which they then invest.
Second, the ambiguity of the messages sent by exit provides manage-
ment with leeway to avoid responding to shareholders' concerns. This
lack of responsiveness will be more likely with respect to certain policies
that benefit management, or with which management has a conflict of
interest. Voting, therefore, generally provides a wider range of choices
for shareholders and fosters greater managerial accountability.
The exit option also has drawbacks from the standpoint of coersion
in the tender offer context. Although all shareholders may favor existing
management, they may nevertheless sell their shares at a premium to a
bidder because they fear that other shareholders will tender their shares
to the bidder,19 leaving remaining shareholders with lower-valued mi-
nority shares in a corporation controlled by the bidder. Collective deci-
sion-making in this change of control context can free the individual
shareholder from the coercive aspects of exit.1 99
Another claimed advantage of exit is that an individual is more
likely to consider alternative costs when making a decision to exit than
when participating through voting in collective decision-making. 20° The
responsibility of making the decision to exit rests solely with the individ-
ual. For this reason, Von Mises, in speaking of the advantages of the
market over the democratic voting process, claimed that the market is
"less corruptible.120 1 This argument is less significant, however, in the
shareholder voting context because, assuming the shareholder becomes
informed,2 "2 the economic impact of voting decisions on the shareholder
should be readily apparent to him. The shareholder owns a proportion-
ate interest in the enterprise, and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion requires disclosure to him of economic consequences.
The costs considered by the shareholder when voting may be in fact
198. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and A Proposed Remedy, 12
DEL. J. CORP. L. 911, 923, 926 (1987); Booth, supra note 180, at 1646-47, 1683; Louis Lowen-
stein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
249, 307-09 (1983).
199. Bebchuk, supra note 198, at 931-32, 934-35; Booth, supra note 180, at 1683.
200. Buchanan, supra note 195, at 337, 340.
201. LUDWIG VON MISEs, SOCIALIsM 21 (1951) (contending that "[tihe average man is
both better informed and less corruptible in the decisions he makes as a consumer than as a
voter at political elections").
202. See text accompanying notes 188-90.
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more extensive than those considered by the shareholder when exiting.
Professor Buchanan argues that decision-making through voting may
broaden a person's identification, resulting in decision-making based on a
more inclusive value scale.2" 3 If that is the case, voting may be particu-
larly preferable to exit when the issue involves the internalization of ex-
ternal costs. Because the method chosen may affect the quality of
decision-making or the costs taken into account, voting may better ad-
dress corporate social responsibility issues than exit.
In a similar vein, commentators argue that a shareholder's decision
to exercise voice through the submission of a proposal under the federal
shareholder proposal rule may not take into account the cost to the cor-
poration of including the proposal in its proxy statement.2" Other
shareholders, who subsidize the individual's expression of concern, do
not benefit because most shareholder proposals do not obtain sufficient
favorable votes.2 5 Exit is preferable because, with respect to that deci-
sion, the unhappy individual shareholder bears all the costs. The federal
shareholder proposal rule, however, addresses the collective action prob-
lem that plagues shareholder voting by decreasing the individual share-
holder's cost of participation. The costs of the system are not large in
absolute terms, 20 6 and, as a method of demonstrating dissatisfaction, it is
much less costly than the market's ultimate weapon: the takeover.2
0 7
Individual exit itself is not inexpensive because commissions and tax con-
sequences must be taken into account.
Further differences between exit and voice are important. First, exit
provides choices that are limited to existing alternatives, °8 whereas voice
provides a mechanism for choosing among future courses of action.20 9
Shareholders may exit when a corporation has entered into an unfortu-
nate transaction, but they suffer losses on the sale of their shares. If
shareholders can vote in advance on the transaction, their vote may pre-
vent or alter it. Moreover, the specter of shareholder voting causes man-
203. Buchanan, supra note 195, at 336-37, 342.
204. Dent, supra note 183, at 14; Liebeler, supra note 183, at 438-39.
205. Dent, supra note 183, at 12; Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting, supra note 131, at 423;
Liebeler, supra note 183, at 438-41, 467.
206. Dent, supra note 183, at 14, 38; Liebeler, supra note 183, at 454.
207. Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1425-26 (1985); Louis Lowenstein, Hostile Takeovers: A Remedy of
First Report or Last Resort, 15th ANN. SEC. REG. INST. 9 (1988). Costs of tender offers in-
clude share acquisition costs, legal and other professional costs, and costs of solicitations and
advertisements. See Lowenstein, supra at 31 ("At an average of roughly four percent of trans-
action values, the fees [for takeovers] have been aggregating about $6-7 billion a year.").
208. VON MisEs, supra note 201, at 271.
209. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 175, at 16, 38, 43; Buchanan, supra note 195, at 339.
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agers to consult shareholders before proposing certain transactions. 21°
Consultation is less likely to occur if the shareholders' only recourse is
exit.
Second, relying on exit as a decision-making mechanism has the per-
verse effect of encouraging activities favored by those persons who are no
longer affiliated with the corporation.211 Once enough shareholders have
left because of dissatisfaction with the corporation, the market effect of
their exit arguably causes their views to be considered by management.
In contrast, voting permits the expression of choices by shareholders who
have a continuing stake in the enterprise.
Finally, the corporation benefits if shareholders exercise voice rather
than merely exiting, which could create financial difficulties for the cor-
poration. Thus, the corporation may be better served by viewing exit,
rather than voice, as a last resort. 212
The more ready acceptance of exit by shareholders confirms Profes-
sor Hirschman's observation that individuals may be better served
through one mechanism rather than another, but that they nevertheless
choose not to use the better one.213 He gives, as a classic example, share-
holders' reaction to a corporation's economic difficulties. In his view
such difficulties ordinarily trigger exit, when in fact management is more
sensitive at those times to voice.214 He further notes that the mechanism
less used will be routinely undervalued.215
The explanation for the use of exit may reside in the observation
that the easier it is to exit, the less shareholders will use voice (although,
ironically, that is also when voice is most effective). 216 The difficulty of
disposing of large blocks of stock and indexing21 7 provide possible expla-
210. Ryan, supra note 170, at 177 n.312.
211. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 175, at 46-47.
212. Id. at 253-54; Buchanan, supra note 195, at 338-39.
213. HI1SCHMAN, supra note 175, at 122.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 80-81, 125.
216. Id. at 82-83.
217. Institutional shareholders who index funds (such as CaIPERS) may be viewed as long-
term investors. See Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 173, at 882. As long-term
investors, they may have a greater incentive than traders to monitor the performance of corpo-
rations in the index. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. Rv. 863, 863-64 (1991); Bevis
Longstreth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 113, 118-19
(1991) (citing position of CalPERS). But see Coffee, supra note 70, at 1341 (arguing that index
managers have little reason to monitor because of "radical cost economizing" due to fierce
competition among index managers); Louis Lowenstein, Index Investment Strategies and Cor-
porate Governance, 1991 ANNUAL COLLOQUIUM ON CORPORATE LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY
1, 13-17 (providing reasons why most indexes prefer to sit "on their hands").
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nations for the increasing use of voice by institutional investors.218 As
institutional investors gain experience with this mechanism, they may use
voice more frequently. Even so, the legal limitations on shareholder vot-
ing219 and conflicts of interest of institutional shareholders220 limit to
some degree its more extensive use.
The comparison of exit and voice demonstrates that voting is partic-
ularly useful in certain circumstances. First, voting on specific topics is
desirable because of the ambiguity of the message inherent in exit. If the
shareholders' dissatisfaction is general and nonspecific, however, exit
may be more appropriate, depending on one's assessment of the efficiency
of markets in disciplining managers. Second, shareholder voting is pref-
erable to exit on control issues (such as cumulative voting provisions)
and conflict of interest issues (such as executive compensation and inter-
ested transactions). Because of the ambiguity of the message given by
exit, managers are likely to resist interpretations that will result in
changes that may adversely affect them. Third, having shareholders vote
on changes of control can lessen the coercive aspect of exit in the tender
offer context. Control share acquisition statutes recently adopted by a
number of states contain such voting rights.221 Finally, voting is particu-
larly useful when making decisions on a more inclusive value scale is
desirable. Thus, voting on social responsibility proposals is better than
exiting, even though voting by shareholders on these issues was one of
the last areas to receive the Commission's support. One should also note
that voting is more important in closely-held corporations because exit is
more difficult.
2. Comparison of Voting and Judicial Oversight
of Corporate Behavior
Voting and judicial action provide needed checks and balances on
the corporate governance system that management administers. This
section compares these spheres of accountability.
Both voting and judicial oversight have advantages. Voting permits
shareholders to review a transaction in advance and requires disclosure
before a transaction becomes binding.222 Judicial oversight occurs after
the fact, but it permits consideration of the nature of the power relation-
ship between the parties and the evaluation of unanticipated problems.
218. Conard, supra note 72, at 145 n.92.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 52-76.
220. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 77-80.
222. Lowenstein, supra note 198, at 317, 330.
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Each method also has disadvantages that are, in part, offset by the
availability of the other to assure accountability. For example, voting is
permitted only on certain subjects,2 23 but any transaction may warrant
judicial oversight. Voting suffers from collective action problems and is
plagued by managerial domination of the proxy machinery. Judicial
oversight, however, protects shareholders from overreaching by
management.
Judicial oversight has its own problems, including numerous proce-
dural obstacles such as demand requirements224 and motions to dismiss
by litigation committees.22 5 It becomes substantially illusory when
courts apply the business judgment rule226 and is expensive and time con-
suming. Voting, however, particularly under the control and conflict of
interest voting systems proposed in this Article, decreases the necessity of
judicial oversight by permitting shareholders to review important trans-
actions before they occur, especially in situations where breaches of duty
are most likely to happen or where the potential harm to shareholders
may be most severe.
3. Separate Operation of Spheres of Accountability
Judicial oversight, markets, and voting rights serve as important
checks and balances in the corporate governance system. No method of
accountability should readily restrict the others. For example, sharehold-
ers should not vote to relieve directors of their fiduciary obligations or
vote to restrict unduly the operation of markets.
At first glance, it may seem inconsistent to advocate voting rights
for shareholders generally, but to prohibit shareholder voting on most
resolutions that would limit the fiduciary duties of managers.2 27 Voting
rights for shareholders, however, generally increase the accountability of
managers. This result is consistent with the purpose of voting rights.
But permitting shareholders to relieve directors of fiduciary obligations
223. See supra text accompanying notes 42-49; see also Parts V and VI, infra notes 229-320
and accompanying text (concerning the voting rights included in the control and conflict of
interest voting systems).
224. See, eg., In re Kaufman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 262 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 857 (1973); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 809-10 (Del. 1984).
225. See, eg., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 783-84 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 623-24, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 922, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996 (1979).
226. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1985); Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
227. This discussion is not only relevant to statutes permitting directors to be relieved of
their duty of care, but to cases that apply a lesser fiduciary duty standard because a share-
holder vote has been taken. See, e.g., Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 177, 178-
79, 91 A.2d 57, 58 (1952).
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would serve to decrease the accountability of managers. When one ac-
cepts the value of having checks and balances in the corporate system,
one can be less concerned with the disadvantages of voting when voting
operates to increase accountability, but be more concerned with those
disadvantages when decreased accountability results. Of course, another
reason for not permitting shareholders to vote to relieve directors of their
fiduciary obligations is that third parties, such as debtholders and em-
ployees, also benefit from directors' meeting certain fiduciary
obligations.228
Where the adoption or deletion of shareholder voting provisions im-
pacting market operations would increase accountability, the advantages
of voting should receive greater weight. When such provisions would
decrease accountability, however, the disadvantages of voting assume
more importance. Of course, whether accountability is affected substan-
tially depends on one's assessment of the value of markets and judicial
action and the provision's effect on the operation of these spheres.
V. REWORKING SHAREHOLDER VETO RIGHTS UNDER STATE LAW:
THE CONTROL VOTING SYSTEM
A voting system constructed under the umbrella concept of control
is consistent with modem conceptions of the corporation and the current
corporate environment. This umbrella concept provides a more worka-
ble framework than a "risk of loss" umbrella under which voting rights
depend on a proposed transaction or provision change's effect on the risk
of a shareholder's investment. It is exceedingly difficult to determine the
effect on risk of different kinds of transactions and provision changes.22 9
In addition, the impact on risk of similar transactions or provision
changes can vary for different corporations and for the same corporation
228. Under the residual rights theory, for example, control by shareholders is justified on
the basis that shareholders as residual owners have the greatest incentive to maximize the
value of the firm. Dallas, supra note 74, at 49-63. Of course, the argument would be that they
maximize the value of the firm by relieving directors of some fiduciary obligations.
229. An effort to tie shareholder veto rights to the effect a transaction has on the systematic
risk of a shareholder's investment in a company is consistent with the positions of Professors
Manning and Eisenberg on appraisal rights. Even so, tying voting rights to alterations of the
beta of a corporation's stock (or its sensitivity to systematic risk) by more than, say twenty-five
percent, is unworkable. GILSON, supra note 138, at 573-77. Numerous factors affect system-
atic risk, making measurement of changes in beta difficult and unrealistic. Although perfec-
tion in a voting scheme cannot be expected, a voting system based on the degree of risk
requires too many difficult valuation judgments that would need to be made for each corpora-
tion. For example, what impact does a decision to list or de-list the corporation's stock on a
national stock exchange or to adopt cumulative voting have on the beta of the corporation's
stock? Moreover, these questions are based on the debatable assumption that the beta of the
corporation's stock is stable over time. Id. at 577.
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at different times. This observation does not imply that one can always
identify control changes (and conflict of interest transactions) easily.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive, consistent, uniform system of share-
holder voting rights can best be based on control and conflict of interest
concepts. These concepts also focus on matters of special economic sig-
nificance. As this Article will discuss later, the risk of loss concept, how-
ever, has some limited use within the control and conflict of interest
voting schemes, to limit further voting rights.23 °
A. Evolving Trend to Focus on Control Changes
Support exists for providing special legal rules for control changes in
statutes, legal reform proposals, and judicial opinions. In fact, one can
discern an increasing tendency by state legislatures and scholars to focus
on protecting shareholders in control change situations. Control changes
are central to statutory merger provisions adopted in a number of states
in accordance with the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA), which deny shareholders of the surviving corporation voting
and appraisal rights if their corporation's articles of incorporation remain
unchanged and their corporation does not issue more than twenty per-
cent of its outstanding voting stock in the merger.2 31
The official comment to this RMBCA provision,2 32 however, does
not acknowledge explicitly the provision's main focus on control (here
vote dilution). It states that the "theory behind this [modification] is that
shareholders' votes should be required only if the transaction fundamen-
tally alters the character of the enterprise or substantially reduces the
shareholders' participation in voting or profit distribution. 23 3 Contrary
to this language, the provision does not require a shareholder vote on a
transaction that "fundamentally alters the character" of the surviving
corporation, such as a merger in which the surviving corporation issues
debt securities, property, or cash to acquire another corporation's busi-
ness, or where the consideration given equals or exceeds the value of
twenty percent of the voting stock of the surviving corporation. In addi-
tion, this provision does not require a vote for a merger that substantially
reduces the earnings of the corporation available for "profit distribu-
tion," such as a merger in which a corporation assumes a substantial
amount of debt to acquire another corporation. Thus, the underlying
rationale of this provision is that voting is required on mergers that sub-
230. See infra Part VI E.
231. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 11.03(g) (1984); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 251(0 (1991); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201 (West 1990) (16 2/3%).
232. REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 11.03 cmt. 2 (1984).
233. Id.
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stantially reduce the shareholders' "participation in voting." Not only
does the RMBCA fail to acknowledge fully the importance of this dilu-
tion principle to its modification, but it does not provide for voting rights
in all situations where such a dilution occurs. For example, with a trian-
gular merger234 it is possible to deny voting rights to shareholders
notwithstanding a substantial dilution of their voting rights.
The American Law Institute's tentative draft of the Principles of
Corporate Governance (ALI Draft) 235 represents a further evolution of the
focus on control changes. Section 6.01 of the ALI Draft recommends that
shareholders vote on "control transactions. '236 This is designed gener-
ally to cover transactions in which corporate entities sell, acquire or com-
bine assets or businesses237 and to address the substance of a transaction
(for example, whether dilution has occurred) rather than its form. 38
Unlike the system of voting proposed in this Article, section 6.01 is lim-
ited in scope and does not appear to adhere consistently to the change of
control concept. This may, in part, be due to the ALI Draft's numerous
revisions, resulting in a document consisting of an amalgam of views of
various drafters and the ALI membership. Section 6.01 applies only to
transactions and does not cover other kinds of changes in control such as
amendments to bylaws.239 It is limited to transactions in which board
approval is necessary and thus does not address the new shareholder vot-
ing rights under control share acquisition statutes.24° Moreover, it pro-
vides for a majority vote of shareholders241 in all situations, in contrast to
the control voting system which provides for supermajority voting and
voting by disinterested shareholders in appropriate situations. In addi-
tion, the ALIDraft does not adhere consistently to the control concept in
its definition of "control transactions." For example, it does not require
a shareholder vote for certain kinds of transactions, such as mergers,
consolidations, or mandatory share exchanges, in which the surviving
corporation issues no more than twenty-five percent of its equity securi-
ties, even though control may in fact have changed due to the securities
234. A triangular merger involves the merger of a subsidiary with a target company in
which the stock of the parent company held by the subsidiary is distributed to the target
company's shareholders. See GILSON, supra note 138, at 528-32.
235. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATION (Tentative Draft No. 11, April 25, 1991) [hereinafter ALI DRAFT].
236. See id. § 6.01; see also 1d. § 1.32 (defining control transactions).
237. Id. §§ 1.32, 6.01, cmt. d at 509-10.
238. Id. § 6.01 cmt. 2(2) at 507; see also id. § 1.32, cmt. a at 50-51 (noting that the ability
to classify a given transaction in any of several forms can obscure its substance).
239. Id. § 6.01, cmt. d at 511.
240. Id. at 509-10; id. § 1.32, cmt. b at 55.
241. Id. §§ 1.01a(a), 6.01, cmt. a(2) at 507.
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being issued to a control person or group.2 42 It does not require share-
holders in an acquired corporation to vote on a merger if the acquiring
corporation issues less than twenty-five percent of its equity securities,
even though control has changed as far as these shareholders are con-
cerned.243 In addition, the ALI Draft defines a sale of assets as a control
transaction when the corporation is left without a "significant continuing
business," even though control by shareholders of the selling corporation
may not have changed over the transferred assets.2"
Court decisions have also recognized that different rules may be nec-
essary in conflict of interest or change of control situations. For exam-
ple, in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,245 the Delaware Supreme Court
recognized the importance of the minority shareholder vote in merger
transactions in which controlling shareholders are parties. Provided
there is full disclosure, such a vote results in the burden of proof shifting
to the complaining shareholders to prove the transaction was unfair.246
In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court has created an enhanced busi-
ness judgment rule to apply when change of control issues are in-
volved.247 The courts in Delaware also have invalidated board actions
that serve the primary purpose of impairing or impeding shareholder de-
mocracy or voting rights.248
B. The Proposed Control Voting System
This section develops a system of voting rights based on the concept
of control. Voting rights are triggered by changes affecting the exercise
of voice that alter control or power relationships in three situations: be-
tween management249 and shareholders, between controlling and minor-
ity shareholders, and between common shareholders and other non-
management coalitions, such as preferred shareholders and debtholders.
In addition, voting rights are triggered by transactions that result in the
242. Section 1.32(a)(1) of the ALI Draft specifically excludes mergers, consolidations, and
mandatory share exchanges of this type from the definition of transaction in control. Id.
§ 1.32(a)(1) & at 507-08. If the American Law Institute drafters intended some mergers, con-
solidations, and mandatory share exchanges of this type to be considered transactions in con-
trol under the general language of § 1.32(a)(3), the language of and comment on § 1.32 should
be modified accordingly.
243. See id. § 1.32(a)(1).
244. Id. § 1.32(a)(2); see infra text accompanying notes 294-96.
245. 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983).
246. Id.
247. See, eg., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180
(Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
248. See, e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-63 (Del. 1988).
249. In this Article, the term "management" refers to directors of the corporation who are
also employees and officers of the corporation.
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acquisition, maintenance, or loss of control by a power coalition, or by
the substantial dilution or nullification of voting rights. Under this con-
trol voting scheme, changes that alter control relationships, whether by
the corporation's amending its articles or bylaws, issuing or repurchasing
stock, or merging or selling its assets, require a shareholder vote.
The control voting system contains several underlying assumptions.
The main assumption is that the shareholders' central right is to elect
and remove directors, and that all other voting rights are related to this
right. Shareholders have a right to vote on provisions or transactions
that affect the shareholders' right to elect and remove directors. The rea-
son for this assumption is that otherwise the system would duplicate
largely the existing system, which is not based on any consistent princi-
ple. Because change of control is the theme, the right to elect and re-
move directors is the logical starting point for building the system. Also
assumed is majority rule, although the deletion of a provision benefiting
minority shareholders requires that the same percentage vote cast in its
favor on adoption be cast in favor of its deletion. This latter rule gives
appropriate deference to the degree of support that the provision had at
its adoption and to the loss of control by minority shareholders. State
legislatures could specify other starting points.
The principal rules are as follows. The addition or deletion of a
provision that shifts control from shareholders to managers requires a
majority vote of disinterested shares,250 but it does not require a vote of
the board. The addition or deletion of a provision that shifts control
from managers to shareholders may be approved by the board alone or
by a majority vote of shares.2"'
The addition or deletion of a provision that shifts control or power
250. Disinterested shares in this context would exclude shares over which voting could be
exercised or directed by directors who are also employees of the corporation or by officers of
the corporation or by a person with whom such director or officer has a "close," "controlling,"
or "financial" relationship. See infra text accompanying notes 308-10. In addition, disinter-
ested shares would exclude shares held by the corporation or any subsidiaries, shares held by
any savings, employee stock ownership, or other employee benefit plan of the corporation or
any of its subsidiaries to the extent that the voting of those shares is exercised or directed by
such corporation or any such subsidiary or by persons selected by such corporation or any
such subsidiary. For purposes of this Article, disinterested shares would also exclude shares
subject to standstill agreements with the corporation or any such subsidiary.
251. Alternate systems provide for the approval of a shift of control from managers to
shareholders either by both shareholders and directors or by disinterested shareholders. The
former system gives directors a veto power over such shift. I have rejected this alternative
because I believe that, other than for mandatory provisions, the shareholders, not directors,
should decide the appropriate allocation of control between managers and shareholders. I
have also rejected the system that gives disinterested shareholders control over the shift in
power from managers to shareholders in recognition of the fact that managers have the power
which is being shifted.
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from the majority shareholders to minority shareholders requires the ap-
proval of a majority vote of shareholders. If the shift places additional
power in the board of directors, a majority vote of disinterested shares is
required. The deletion or addition of a provision that results in a shift of
control from minority shareholders to majority shareholders requires the
same percentage vote that was cast to create the present situation. Shifts
of control among majority and minority shareholders neither permit nor
require board participation.
In addition, a shift in control with respect to the exercise of voice
from common shareholders to other coalitions requires a majority vote of
disinterested shares.2"2 A shift of this control back to shareholders re-
quires the consent of the other coalitions.
Finally, a transaction that results in the acquisition, maintenance or
loss of control by one of the following four methods requires a majority
vote of disinterested shares: (1) the acquisition of control by a control
person or group, (2) the loss of control by a control person or group, (3)
the entrenchment of management by a transaction affecting share owner-
ship, or (4) the substantial dilution or nullification of voting rights.253
This Article analyzes below a number of hypothetical transactions
and provisions to demonstrate when the control voting system mandates
shareholder voting rights. The article also analyzes voting procedures in
the event that shareholder voting is required. One should note, however,
that states need to enact default provisions for situations where share-
holders have not voted. Under the control voting system, the significant
question in selecting default provisions is whether power should reside
initially in management, majority shareholders, or minority sharehold-
252. Disinterested shares in this context would exclude shares over which voting could be
exercised or directed by shareholders who would benefit as members of the other coalition or
persons who have a "close," "controlling," or "financial" relationship with such shareholders.
See infra text accompanying notes 310-12.
253. With respect to the first method, disinterested shares would exclude shares concerning
which voting could be exercised or directed by the emerging control person or group and any
person having a "close," "controlling," or "financial" relationship with such person or group.
See infra text accompanying notes 286-89, 310-12. For the second method, disinterested
shares would exclude shares concerning which voting could be exercised or directed by persons
who would be in control of the corporation after the transaction and any person having a
"close," "controlling," or "financial" relationship with such controlling person. See infra text
accompanying notes 286-89, 310-12. Disinterested shares for the third method would exclude
shares concerning which voting could be exercised or directed by management and persons
"friendly" to management. See infra note 284. With respect to the fourth method, disinter-
ested shares would exclude shares concerning which voting could be exercised or directed by
shareholders who do not experience the same dilution or deprivation of voting rights over
transferred assets as other shareholders with the same kind of stock. If more than one method
for changing control occurs in the same transaction, all applicable definitions of disinterested
shares will be used to determine the shares entitled to vote.
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ers. In addition, if a state chooses default provisions that place control in
majority shareholders rather than management or minority shareholders,
that state may wish to require sunset rules for provisions adopted by
shareholders that shift power away from majority shareholders, at least
when the adopted provisions shift power from majority shareholders to
management.
A state should enact some mandatory provisions involving control
that cannot be changed by a vote of shareholders. Under the control
voting system, a state would select those provisions on the basis of
whether they serve to protect spheres of accountability such as judicial
action, markets, and voting and on an assessment of the effectiveness of
these spheres in assuring accountability. For example, a state may enact
mandatory provisions concerning shareholder notice, the right of a per-
centage of shareholders to call meetings, and possibly mandatory written
consent procedures to preserve the sphere of accountability through vot-
ing. For purposes of demonstrating the analysis of changes under the
control voting system, however, shareholders are assumed to have the
right to change these provisions. The article proposes rules for both the
adoption and deletion of such provisions. Be advised that a legislature
may obtain different conclusions as to whether shareholder veto rights
are called for under the control voting system if it disagrees with the
description or effect attributed to a transaction or provision discussed
below.
This Article contemplates that a legislature would enact a statute
that lists common provisions and transactions and the pertinent voting
rights attributed thereto under the control voting system. The statute
would also cover less common provisions and transactions with general
control shift language, which would require the board of directors of a
company in the first instance to determine the effect on control of a pro-
vision or transaction. A shareholder could challenge the board's deci-
sions under general fiduciary principles.
1. Corporate Articles and Bylaws
Under the laws of most states, board approval and a vote of share-
holders is necessary to amend corporate articles.2" 4 Either shareholders
or the board acting alone can amend bylaws.2 55 Under the proposed vot-
ing system, the method for changing a provision will no longer depend
254. See cases and statutes cited supra note 45.
255. See cases and statutes cited supra note 49.
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on which corporate document contains the provision.256 The substance
of the provision will determine the amendment method. Moreover, be-
cause the direction of the control change differs depending on whether it
involves the amendment or deletion of a provision, different methods
may apply to the amendment or deletion of the same provision.
a. Name, address or principal office, purpose clause
None of these provisions commonly found in a corporation's articles
or bylaws would require a shareholder vote under the control voting sys-
tem. Changes in these provisions do not affect the shareholders' right to
elect or remove directors.25 7
b. Examples of articles or bylaw provisions altering control
relationship between management and shareholders
The following sections analyze provisions that shift control between
management and shareholders.
(i) Staggered board provisions
The articles may contain a provision that divides directors into
classes so that only a fraction of the directors come up for re-election
each year. Under Delaware law, directors may be divided into one, two,
or three classes.258 A staggered board provision presents an obstacle for
a new controlling shareholder who desires majority representation on the
board, particularly where directors may be removed only for cause. 219
Under current law, the adoption or deletion of such a provision requires
a majority vote of both the board of directors and shareholders.2 60
Under the control voting system the analysis would be as follows.
The adoption of a staggered board provision would shift control from
shareholders to management for a period of time. Thus, adoption would
require a majority vote of disinterested shares. In addition, deletion
would require either the board's acting alone or a majority vote of shares.
256. That some provisions in a corporation's articles should not require shareholder ap-
proval has been recognized. See REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr § 10.02 (1990).
257. Changes in a purpose clause cannot be analogized either to a sale of assets transaction
that leaves the corporation without a significant business or to dissolution. See infra text ac-
companying notes 294-96. Whereas the latter two transactions have the effect of essentially
rendering the rights of shareholders to elect or remove directors meaningless, the former
change does not. Changes in the purpose clause arguably fall within the conflict of interest
voting system. See infra text accompanying notes 314-19.
258. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1991).
259. See id. § 141(k).
260. See, e.g., id. § 242.
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Staggered board provisions could be viewed as decreasing the ac-
countability of managers through interference with the operation of mar-
kets and thus arguably could fall outside the sphere of voting. However,
staggered board provisions do not reduce substantially such
accountability. 26
1
(ii) Number of directors; straight voting
The adoption of an amendment increasing the number of directors
in a corporation with straight voting can result in the board's becoming
ineffective because of its unwieldy size. Increasing the number of direc-
tors beyond seven will arguably have this effect if the board's desired
function includes effective governance.262 Because such an amendment
tends to shift power from the shareholders to an internal management
group, its adoption would require a majority vote of disinterested shares.
An amendment that decreases the number of directors can have the op-
posite effect and, therefore, its adoption would require either a vote of the
board or a majority vote of shares.
A state legislature could devise a more sophisticated approach.
Either an increase in the number of directors to more than seven or a
decrease in the number of directors from a number greater than seven to
some lesser number would be subject to these rules. Under this modifica-
tion, an increase in the number of directors from three to seven would
not require a shareholders' vote.
Section V B(1)(c)(ii) and section V B(1)(d)(iii) discuss the rules ap-
plicable to an increase or decrease in the number of directors in a corpo-
ration with cumulative voting.
(iii) Call, notice, date, and location of shareholders' meeting
Because directors can amend a corporation's bylaws, they can
thwart the exercise of shareholder control by amending procedural rules
contained in the corporation's bylaws that relate to shareholders' meet-
ings. Courts have found it necessary to place some equitable limitations
on the directors' power to amend the bylaws.263 A case in point is
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, where the board of directors accelerated
the date of the corporation's annual meeting after being notified that a
261. Gilson, Shark Repellent, supra note 139, at 793-96.
262. HENRY MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS 88 (1983). Profes-
sor Mintzberg cites a study finding that the "average size of action-taking groups among of-
ficers and directors was 6.5 [persons], while that of nonaction groups was 14 [persons]." Id.
263. E.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971); see also infra
note 265.
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shareholder intended to wage a proxy fight.2 The Delaware Supreme
Court enjoined the acceleration of the meeting date and reinstated the
old date, because the court found that the directors' purpose in amending
the bylaws was to perpetuate themselves in office and to thwart the exer-
cise of shareholder democracy. While recognizing the board's statutory
right to amend the bylaws, the court stated that "inequitable action does
not become permissible simply because it is legally possible."26 This
reasoning could invalidate other amendments by directors, such as the
postponement of a meeting date at which insurgents have planned ac-
tion,266 deletion of a provision permitting a certain percentage of shares
to call a special shareholders' meeting, the change of the record date be-
ing used for a consent procedure,267 or the change of location of a share-
holders' meeting to a remote location. The determination of "purpose"
is problematic, however, and the court's reasoning may be contrary to
authority clearly granted to directors by state statutes.
The control umbrella would eliminate the problem of contrary stat-
utory language. In addition, the focus would be on the effect of the
amendment and not, as in Schnell, on the purpose of the directors.268
264. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 438-39.
265. Id at 439; see International Banknote Co., Inc. v. Muller, 713 F. Supp. 612, 627
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (enjoining enforcement of a bylaw requiring the filing of nominees 45 days
prior to annual meeting, in part because the bylaw was adopted within 24 hours of notice of
proxy contest and 58 days before scheduled annual meeting); Lerman v. Diagnostic Data Inc.,
421 A.2d 906, 914 (Del. Ch. 1980) (holding invalid a board's action setting the annual meeting
with 63 days' notice, because one of the corporate bylaws required Board nominees to be
submitted at least seventy days in advance of the annual meeting); Petty v. Penntech Papers,
Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975) (holding that where selective redemption by the corpo-
ration of its preferred stock might be directed towards maintaining management in control,
issuance of a temporary restraining order was proper); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.,
230 A.2d 769, 775-77 (Del. Ch. 1967) (holding invalid an exchange of stock which had the
primary purpose of reducing a shareholder's holdings below a majority); Canada S. Oils, Ltd.
v. Manabi Exploration Co., 33 Del. Ch. 537, 543-44, 96 A.2d 810, 813-14 (Del. Ch. 1953)
(enjoining the issuance of stock which had the primary purpose of depriving shareholder of
majority voting control).
266. Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Del. Ch. 1987). But see Stahl v.
Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1121-23 (Del. Ch. 1990) (deferring annual meeting, in
response to announcement of proxy contest and tender offer did not impair or impede effective
exercise of franchise, when date for annual meeting had not yet been fixed).
267. Midway Airlines, Inc. v. Carlson, 628 F. Supp. 244, 246-47 (D. Del. 1985).
268. To some degree Delaware courts have given greater attention to the effect of board
actions when interference with the shareholders' franchise is involved. For example, in Blasius
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658-59 (Del. Ch. 1988), the court held that the
board of directors did not act self-interestedly when it added two new board members in re-
sponse to a shareholder's proposal to increase the size of the board and elect new board mem-
bers through consent solicitation. Nevertheless, the court found that board members had
violated their fiduciary obligations because the effect of its action was to interfere with the
shareholders' franchise. The court, however, returning to a focus on purpose, said that such
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The fact that valid business reasons may support the amendment does
not remove the shareholders' right to vote on the control shift. Because
changes in call, notice, date, and location of shareholders' meetings often
are designed to apply to the next shareholders' meeting, the requirement
of a shareholder vote would preclude them, unless these changes are
made applicable only to future meetings or if the changes are neutral
with respect to control. This result is not troublesome, however, because
it discourages management from acting self-interestedly to shift control
to itself when confronted with a proxy contest. The present need for
court intervention to prevent inequitable conduct expressly permitted by
statutes is an indication of the inadequacy of those statutes. A more eq-
uitable statute such as that proposed here would make court intervention
unnecessary, except in extraordinary situations.
Specifically, the deletion of a provision allowing shareholders to call
a special shareholders' meeting results in a power shift from shareholders
to managers and thus would require a majority vote of disinterested
shares. The adoption of such a provision has the reverse effect and,
therefore, would require action by the board of directors or a majority of
shareholders. As previously noted, a state legislature may desire to enact
mandatory call provisions in order to preserve the accountability of man-
agers through voting.
The adoption of a notice provision that gives shareholders insuffi-
cient time to mount an effective proxy contest shifts power from share-
holders to managers and would, therefore, require a majority vote of
disinterested shares. The deletion of such a provision would have the
reverse effect and would require action by the board or a majority of
shareholders. A state legislature could provide for minimum and maxi-
mum notice periods and deem changes within these limits to have a neu-
tral effect on control.
A control shift is more difficult to identify when the date or location
of a shareholders' meeting is to be changed. Directors must determine
interference would be permissible if the board members could show a compelling business
purpose for their actions, which had not been shown in this case. Id at 659-63.
In Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (D.C.N.Y.
1985), the court made no reference to purpose. In that case the court invalidated the issuance
of "piggyback" preferred stock which provided for twenty-five votes per share unless the
shares were transferred, in which case the shares were only entitled to five votes per share for
the first thirty-six months. Id at 408, 410. The court's holding rested on a statutory provi-
sion, § 202(b) of Delaware General Corporation Law, for the proposition that such a restric-
tion on transfer requires a shareholders' vote. Id. at 409-10. Interestingly, though, the court
also cited Schnell for the proposition that a "change in corporate structure of this magnitude"
required shareholder approval, without reference to the board's purpose in making the change.
Id. at 410.
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whether a control shift is involved. Under the principles enunciated in
Smith v. Van Gorkom,269 directors would be required to inform them-
selves as to all information that was reasonably available to them27 in
order to determine whether the change would shift control from share-
holders to directors. For example, if the change would substantially dis-
rupt the efforts of shareholders planning a proxy contest and
management is aware of these plans, the change is precluded unless the
directors obtain the approval of a majority of disinterested shares.
The adoption of a provision that gives directors the discretion to
determine from year to year the date and location of the shareholders'
annual meeting shifts control from shareholders to managers and would
require a majority vote of disinterested shares. One could argue, how-
ever, that such a provision falls outside the sphere of voting because it
undermines unduly the accountability of managers by interfering sub-
stantially with the ability of shareholders to wage a proxy contest. The
deletion of this provision would require approval by the board or a ma-
jority vote of shares.
(iv) Provision for shareholders' action without a meeting (not
mandated by statute) 271
A provision allowing shareholders to act by written consent permits
shareholders to act without having a meeting. This right is particularly
important in some states where shareholders do not have the right to call
special meetings unless a provision to that effect is included in the corpo-
ration's articles or bylaws.272 The adoption of a written consent provi-
sion shifts control from management to shareholders by providing
shareholders an alternate method for participating in the governance of
the corporation. Under the proposed control voting system, the board or
a majority vote of shares may adopt such a provision. The deletion of a
written consent provision shifts power from shareholders to the manage-
ment and would require a majority vote of disinterested shares. State
269. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
270. Id. at 872.
271. Most states provide for shareholder action without a meeting unless such provision is
deleted by an amendment to the articles of incorporation. CAL. CORP. CODE § 603 (West
1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 615 (McKinney 1986);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2524 (Supp. 1991). The Revised Model Business Corporation
Act, however, provides for action by the written consent of all shareholders entitled to vote but
does not specifically allow for deletion of such provision from the articles of incorporation.
REv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 7.04 (1984).
272. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 602(c) [Table T.1]
(McKinney 1986). But see CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(d) (West 1990) (mandating that 10% of
shares can call special meetings of shareholders).
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legislatures may desire to enact mandatory written consent provisions in
order to preserve the accountability of managers through voting.
(v) Removal of Directors; Vacancies
The adoption of a provision permitting the removal of directors only
for cause or permitting directors to fill vacancies shifts power from share-
holders to managers and, therefore, would require a majority vote of dis-
interested shares. The deletion of such provisions or the adoption of a
provision permitting directors to be removed with or without cause or
permitting shareholders to fill vacancies results in control moving from
managers to shareholders and thus would require a majority vote of di-
rectors or shareholders.
c. Examples of articles or bylaw provisions altering the control
relationship between controlling and minority
shareholders
The following examples illustrate the proper analysis when provi-
sions shift control between controlling and minority shareholders.
(i) Cumulative voting provisions (not mandated by statute)
Cumulative voting provisions permit individual shareholders to ac-
cumulate the votes they can cast for all directorate positions and vote
them for fewer positions.273 Cumulative voting increases the opportunity
for minority shareholders to elect a fraction of the board; with straight
voting, majority shareholders elect all the directors. The adoption of a
cumulative voting provision shifts control from controlling to minority
shareholders. Under the proposed control voting system, adoption of
this provision would require a majority vote of shares. The deletion of
the provision would require the same percentage vote that was cast for its
adoption. A disinterested vote of shares is not required, because arguably
a cumulative voting provision does not alter effectively the power rela-
tionship between management and shareholders.
(ii) Decreasing number of directors; cumulative voting (not
mandated by statute)
If a corporation utilizes cumulative voting, an amendment decreas-
ing the number of directors on the board alters the control relationship
between controlling and minority shareholders, because minority share-
holders will have to accumulate more votes to elect a director to the
273. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1991).
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board.274 Such an amendment shifts control from minority to control-
ling shareholders.275 Adoption would require the same percentage vote
as was cast in favor of cumulative voting. Section V B(1)(d)(iii) discusses
an amendment increasing the number of directors in a corporation with
cumulative voting.
d. Examples of articles or bylaw provisions altering both the
control relationship between management and
shareholders and between controlling and minority
shareholders
(i) Simple supermajority shareholder voting provisions; high
quorum requirements
Simple supermajority voting and high quorum requirements shift
control from controlling to minority shareholders by requiring the con-
sent or attendance at meetings of minority shareholders. Like staggered
board provisions, however, they also entrench management. Such provi-
sions discourage potential tender offerors because they either must ac-
quire more than a majority of the shares or persuade minority
shareholders to accede to their plans for the corporation.
Accordingly, the rules applicable either to a shift of control from
controlling to minority shareholders or a shift of control from sharehold-
ers to managers are not clearly applicable. In recognition of the latter
shift, however, the adoption of such provision should require a majority
vote of disinterested shares.27 6 Moreover, in recognition of the former
shift, the required vote to delete the provision should be the same per-
centage vote that was cast for the provision's adoption.
Like the staggered board provision, supermajority voting and high
quorum provisions arguably could fall outside the sphere of voting, but
these provisions also do not substantially reduce managerial accountabil-
ity through interference with the market for corporate control.277
274. California law mandates for certain corporations cumulative voting that can be in-
voked by a proper request from a shareholder. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301.5, 708 (,Vest 1990 &
Supp. 1992). Consequently, California law gives special attention to requiring a minimum
number of directors and to procedures for changing the number of directors. Id. § 212.
275. This effect can be seen by reading the facts in Coalition To Advocate Public Utility
Responsibility, Inc. v. Engels, 364 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (D. Minn. 1973).
276. Had this rule been in operation when Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Savings & Loan,
572 F. Supp. 1455 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984), was decided, manage-
ment may not have been able to defeat the efforts of plaintiff shareholders by adopting a
supermajority bylaw provision.
277. Gilson, Shark Repellent, supra note 139, at 800. Some supermajority voting provi-
sions require a supermajority vote on a merger or other transaction with a "related person" (a
party having a substantial ownership interest in the corporation) only if the transaction is not
[Vol. 71
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(ii) Control share acquisition provisions (not mandated by statute)
Briefly, a control share acquisition provision prohibits a person from
voting or acquiring control shares unless a majority of "disinterested
shares" vote in favor of granting the control shares voting rights.
278
Shares owned by management and the acquirer of control shares are con-
sidered "interested shares. 2 79  This provision is, in essence, a
supermajority voting provision because the minority shareholders have
power over who will control the corporation. The provision also de-
creases the coercive aspect of tender offers by permitting collective deci-
sion making by shareholders.280
Under the control voting system, this provision shifts control from
controlling to minority shareholders, which normally would require a
majority vote of shares for its adoption. Because the provision may make
it more difficult for a potential acquirer to obtain control and thus may
serve to entrench management, however, it requires a majority vote of
"disinterested" shares. The deletion of this provision shifts power from
the minority to controlling shareholders and, accordingly, requires the
same vote that was cast in favor of its adoption.
approved by a majority of "continuing directors," defined as directors who were in office at the
time the related person acquired a substantial interest in the corporation. Id at 785. The
effect of such a provision is to put in the hands of the continuing directors the decision as to
whether a majority or supermajority vote will be required. Because the decision as to whether
the corporation should adopt a supermajority voting provision is a matter for a majority vote
of disinterested shares, whether this power should be delegated to directors is likewise a deci-
sion requiring such vote.
The analysis concerning the deletion of this more complex supermajority voting provision
(with the express delegation of authority to directors) is more involved than the analysis of the
simple supermajority voting provision discussed in the text. For the simple supermajority vot-
ing provision, the same vote that secured the adoption of the provision is required to delete it,
because its deletion would shift power from minority to majority shareholders. Whether the
deletion of this more complex supermajority voting provision will shift power from minority to
majority shareholders depends on the decisions continuing directors make. A supermajority
vote would not be required if continuing directors approve transactions. Deletion of the provi-
sion therefore would not shift power from minority to majority shareholders over these trans-
actions. The primary shift in control resulting from the deletion of this provision is over
whether a majority or supermajority vote is required. Because its deletion mainly results in a
shift in power over this decision from continuing board members to majority shareholders, a
majority vote of shares or continuing board members should be required for its deletion.
This complex supermajority provision is arguably outside the sphere of shareholder vot-
ing. A legislature might prohibit such provisions on the grounds that they substantially reduce
the accountability of directors by increasing the directors' discretion over the operation of the
market for corporate control.
278. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
279. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0902 (West Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-
42-3 (Burns 1989); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01 (1992).
280. Bebchuk, supra note 198, at 931-32, 934-35; Booth, supra note 180, at 1683.
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(iii) Increasing number of directors; cumulative voting (not
mandated by statute)
Addition of an amendment increasing the number of directors of a
corporation with cumulative voting can increase minority representation
on the board because fewer votes must be accumulated to elect board
members. This amendment thus shifts power from controlling to minor-
ity shareholders. In addition, an amendment increasing the number of
directors can arguably make the board a less effective governing body,2 1
thus shifting power from shareholders to management. Accordingly, in-
creasing the number of directors requires a majority vote of "disinter-
ested" shares.
2. Corporate Transactions: Public and Private Issuances and
Repurchases of Stock, Mergers, Consolidations, Mandatory
Share Exchanges, Sale of Assets, Dissolution and
Other Transactions
These corporate transactions can result in the acquisition and loss of
control by various shareholders over the election of directors. Four ef-
fects on control can occur: (1) a person or group can emerge with a
controlling interest, (2) a person or group can lose a controlling interest,
(3) management can become further entrenched by a transaction affect-
ing share ownership, and (4) shareholder voting rights can become di-
luted or effectively nullified. A board of directors will often need to
determine the effect on control of the transaction, which determination
could be challenged by shareholders under general fiduciary principles.
First, a corporate transaction in which the issuance, cancellation,
redemption, or repurchase of shares results in a new person or group
controlling the corporation requires a majority vote of disinterested
shares. The transaction may include a merger, sale of assets, or public or
private offering. Shares held by the emerging control person or group 282
are interested shares for purposes of the vote.
Second, approval of a transaction that causes a control person or
group to lose a controlling interest over the corporation requires a major-
ity vote of disinterested shares. For example, a merger can result in a
corporation's control person or group losing control over the corpora-
tion's assets once these assets become part of the merged entity. In addi-
tion, the issuance of shares can result in a reduction of the percentage
ownership of a control person or group, causing a loss of control by the
281. See MINTZBERG, supra note 262.
282. See infra text accompanying notes 286-89 for a discussion of the meaning of control
and control group.
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person or group.28 3 Each of these transactions would require a majority
vote of disinterested shares. Shares of the control person or group losing
control would not be considered interested shares for purposes of the
vote.
Third, a transaction affecting share ownership that results in man-
agement and persons friendly to management ("friendly persons") 284
maintaining or acquiring control requires a majority vote of disinterested
shares. Such a transaction would include an issuance of control shares to
management or friendly persons or the repurchase of control shares from
an opposing person or group.28 5
One can define control at the set percentage levels found in control
share acquisition statutes286 or by using the general definition of control
suggested by the ALI Draft. The ALI Draft defines control as the
"power, directly or indirectly... to exercise a controlling influence over
the management or policies of a business organization" 287 and creates a
presumption that the ownership of more than twenty-five percent of the
equity interest in a business organization constitutes control; the owner-
ship of less than that percentage of stock alone raises the opposite pre-
sumption.2 88 In addition, the definition of a control group is important.
The ALI Draft defines it as "a group of persons who act in concert to
283. Cf Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 362,230 A.2d 769, 775 (Del.
Ch. 1967) (finding that directors breached fiduciary duty in authorizing exchange of stock with
the primary purpose of reducing a shareholder's holdings below a majority); Canada S. Oils,
Ltd. v. Manabi Exploration Co., 33 Del. Ch. 537, 543-44, 96 A.2d 810, 813-14 (1953) (en-
joining the issuance of stock for the primary purpose of depriving shareholder of majority
voting control).
284. For purposes of this Article the term "management" refers to those directors who are
also employees and officers of the corporation. Persons friendly to management are persons
with whom such director or officer has a "close," "controlling," or "financial" relationship.
See infra text accompanying notes 308-10. Such persons also include the corporation or any of
its subsidiaries and any savings, employee stock ownership, or other employee benefit plans of
the corporation or any of its subsidiaries to the extent that voting of the shares held by the plan
is exercised or directed by such corporation or any such subsidiary or persons selected by such
corporation or any such subsidiary. Such persons also include a person holding shares of the
corporation pursuant to a standstill agreement with the corporation or any such subsidiary.
This same definition is used in determining "disinterested shares" in the context of a shift of
control from shareholders to management. See supra note 250.
285. Such a transaction could also include the selective redemption of voting preferred
stock, Petty v. Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975), or the issuance of
piggyback preferred stock with differing voting rights depending on whether they are trans-
ferred. Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407, 410
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that the issuance of piggyback preferred stock with reduced voting
rights for 36 months after they are transferred could have had the effect of increasing a con-
trolling group's voting power from one-third to a majority for 36 months).
286. See supra note 80.
287. ALI DRAFT, supra note 235, § 1.05(a).
288. Id § 1.05(b).
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exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of a
business organization pursuant to an arrangement or understanding with
each other."28 9 The concept of persons friendly to management is
broader and includes persons not in the control group but who can be
expected to be friendly to management. 29 It would include any person
acquiring shares subject to standstill agreements and shares owned by
pension funds over which the corporation has authority to appoint trust-
ees or portfolio managers.291
Fourth, a transaction that substantially dilutes or deprives share-
holders of voting rights over corporate assets requires a majority vote of
disinterested shares. The dilution of voting rights increases the collective
action problem of shareholders by decreasing the voting significance of
each share. For example, shareholders may experience a substantial di-
lution of their voting rights when their corporation issues a large amount
of stock to others in a public or private offering or when their corpora-
tion issues a large amount of stock to others in a merger or sale-of-assets
transaction.292 Thus, the corporation's issuance of a "large amount of
stock," which one may define as twenty percent of the corporation's out-
standing voting stock, requires a majority vote of disinterested shares. A
series of unrelated transactions in which shares are issued can also sub-
stantially dilute shareholder voting rights. To deal with this dilution
caused by a series of small transactions, however, shareholders should
vote on the shares authorized in the corporation's articles rather than on
each individual transaction.293
In addition, the deprivation of shareholder voting rights requires a
majority vote of disinterested shares. For example, such a vote would be
required by shareholders who receive no continuing voting interest in the
merged entity, such as minority shareholders in a freeze-out merger, or
by shareholders who experience a change of control over the assets in
that merged entity in one of the ways enumerated in this section. Simi-
larly, a corporation's sale of its assets, leaving the corporation without a
289. Id. § 1.06.
290. See supra note 284.
291. See supra note 284.
292. This rule is similar to the New York Stock Exchange requirement discussed supra text
accompanying note 97. It rejects the distinction made by § 1.32(b) of the ALI Draft, supra
note 235, between widely distributed public offerings and private offerings. The effect of both
offerings is the same as far as dilution is concerned. Moreover, the description of a public
offering in the ALI Draft is not sufficiently precise and may exclude from voting a transaction
having one of the control effects mentioned above.
293. Thus, a shareholders' vote would be required to authorize shares and for certain
issuances.
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significant business,2 94 and an accompanying change of control with re-
spect to the transferred assets, requires a majority vote of disinterested
shares. Dissolution of the corporation would also deprive shareholders
of voting rights by rendering them meaningless, requiring a majority vote
of disinterested shares.
The ALI Draft requires a majority vote of shares for a sale-of-assets
transaction in which the corporation and its subsidiaries are left without
a significant continuing business.2 95 This definition appears consistent
with control concerns, because control over the election of directors is
largely meaningless when a corporation has been left without such a
business.2 96 Nevertheless, a change of control as defined by the four
methods discussed in this section may not have occurred if shareholders
receive ownership interests in the acquiring corporation such that they
retain control over the transferred assets. Therefore, as previously noted,
whether voting is required for a sale-of-assets transaction, defined as one
in which the corporation is left without a significant continuing business,
depends on whether a change of control in one of the four ways discussed
in this section has occurred as a result of the transaction.
3. Transactions Altering the Control Relationship Between Voting
Shareholders and Non-Management Coalitions, such as
Preferred Shareholders and Debtholders
A state legislature may wish to require shareholder voting on shifts
of control between voting shareholders and non-management coalitions,
such as preferred shareholders and debtholders. A shift in control from
voting shareholders to a non-management coalition requires a majority
vote of disinterested shares. Voting shareholders who are also members
of the non-management coalition own interested shares. In order to re-
verse this shift in control, the disinterested consent of the non-manage-
ment coalition should be given by some method.
Because control under the control voting system involves control
over the election of directors, preferred shareholders and debtholders are
the coalitions most likely to be involved. Control can shift from common
shareholders to preferred shareholders when a transaction results in the
issuance of preferred shares with voting rights. If these shares (1) create
294. See infra text accompanying notes 295-96.
295. ALI DRAFr, supra note 235, §§ 1.32(a)(2), 6.01(b).
296. This justification differs from the explanation in the Comment to § 1.32 of the ALI
DRAFr, supra note 235, § 1.32, cmt. b(3) at 58-59, which appears to focus on whether senior
executive officers remain with the corporation. In addition, under the control voting system,
other asset transactions that have one of the four effects mentioned in this section would re-
quire a majority vote of disinterested shares.
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a new controlling interest in a person or group, (2) cause a person or
group to lose a controlling interest, (3) entrench management by issuing
such shares to management or persons friendly to management, or (4)
dilute substantially existing voting rights, the issuance requires a major-
ity vote of disinterested shares. For example, if the board confers on
blank-check preferred shares the right to vote as a class on mergers, the
issuance of these shares would require a majority vote of common shares
either because of the creation of a control group that can veto this impor-
tant kind of transaction or because the issuance substantially dilutes the
voting rights of common shareholders. Subsequent issuances of pre-
ferred shares in this class may or may not have significant additional
control consequences. With respect to an additional issuance, common
shareholders and/or preferred shareholders are entitled to vote if the is-
suance affects control in one of the four ways. The existing preferred
shareholders, for instance, have a right to vote on an additional issuance
if it would dilute substantially their voting rights. Because a series of
unrelated transactions in which shares are issued can also substantially
dilute voting rights, a majority vote of shares (whose rights would be
diluted) is required to authorize preferred shares (with voting rights spec-
ified). Finally, if debtholders acquire voting rights (permitted in some
states),297 the same rules would apply.
Particularly onerous and unusual terms in contracts with other co-
alitions298 can effectively render the voting rights of shareholders over
the election of directors meaningless. These contracts require a majority
vote of disinterested shares.
4. Limitations on the Concept of Control/Power Used in the Control
Voting Systems
One can utilize the concepts of power and control to delineate a
more extensive system of voting rights than that outlined above. The
system discussed above focuses on the effectuation of changes in control
through the exercise of voice, not exit. Moreover, it concentrates on con-
trol over board membership, namely, the rules for electing board mem-
bers and for issuing voting shares. Of course, the central assumptions of
this system are the importance of the board of directors and the right to
elect a board member.299 The following sections discuss extensions of the
297. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1991).
298. Hodge v. Cuba Co., 142 N.J. Eq. 340, 346-47, 60 A.2d 88, 92-93 (Ch. 1948); EISEN-
BERG, supra note 66, at 89-90.
299. See MINTZBERG, supra note 262, at 70-95, 547-54 for a discussion of this issue. See
also EISENBERG, supra note 66, at 139-85 (discussing the various types of boards and the
powers they wield).
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system of control voting.
a. Changes of Control Through Exit
Unlike staggered board and supermajority voting provisions, a
number of defensive tactics affect only the exercise by shareholders of
exit, not voice. Defensive tactics decrease the likelihood that a change of
control through exit will occur by increasing the bidder's costs of taking
over the corporation. In a takeover, shareholders are not concerned with
changing the management of the corporation, but with exiting the corpo-
ration at a premium.
Whether these kinds of defensive tactics should require a share-
holder vote depends on whether matters that influence negatively a bid-
der's decision to seek control should require a vote. One cannot explain
such voting on the basis of there being a shift of control from sharehold-
ers to managers, to minority shareholders, or to non-management coali-
tions. On the" contrary, the control relation involved is between
managers and potential bidders, who may or may not be existing share-
holders. The principle that would support voting by existing sharehold-
ers on these tactics is managerial conflict of interest, which provides the
basis for voting under the conflict of interest voting system discussed in
Part VI.
Nevertheless, if a state legislature is not prepared to embrace the
conflict of interest rationale for voting and instead adopts control as the
operative concept, one can devise a rationale under a broad control ru-
bric which provides for voting on these defensive tactics. Postulated is a
shift in control from existing shareholders to managers over the exit deci-
sion. Managers decrease shareholders' power over exit decisions when
they affect the conditions under which exit will occur.
Of course, virtually all decisions by management provide conditions
for exit. Numerous management decisions, such as whether to open or
close a plant, to develop a new product, or to establish a distributorship
network in some areas and not others, influence a bidder in deciding
whether to seek control of a corporation. Nevertheless, one can distin-
guish managerial decisions that adopt defensive tactics from other deci-
sions by whether they are specifically designed to influence a change of
control through exit. One can identify these decisions, in two ways:
Either (1) they adopt a provision or transaction that is triggered by a
change in control, or (2) they adopt a transaction that is outside the ordi-
nary course of business when a tender offer is imminent or pending. This
Article describes below examples of defensive maneuvers that fall within
these two categories. Note that with respect to any of these defensive
1992]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tactics one can argue that they reduce substantially managerial accounta-
bility through interference with an effective market for corporate control
and, therefore, their adoption falls outside the sphere of shareholder
voting.
(i) Defensive Tactics Triggered by a Change in Control
(a) Right of Redemption
Redemption provisions provide shareholders the right to redeem
their shares at a specified price when a person acquires control of the
corporation.3"° This right does not affect the exercise of voice, but by
making an acquisition more costly it affects the likelihood of a change of
control through exit. Therefore, expanding the concept of control to in-
clude the exit decision would require a majority vote of disinterested
shares to adopt redemption provisions.
(b) Poison Pills
A wide variety of poison pills exist.30 1 An example of a poison pill is
preferred shares issued by a target corporation to its common sharehold-
ers as a dividend. When a change of control occurs, the preferred shares
become convertible into an amount of securities in the target corporation
or the bidding corporation that equals or exceeds in value the tender offer
price.3 2 Similar to the redemption right, the issuance of poison pill pre-
ferred shares increases the cost to a bidder of acquiring the corporation
and, accordingly, discourages a change in control through exit.
Of course, a vote of common shareholders is required if the pre-
ferred shares contain voting provisions, for the reasons given in section V
B(3). The conversion feature of these preferred shares does not contem-
plate control share acquisitions. 3 3 Therefore, control share acquisition
provisions will not be implicated.
300. Redemption rights are found in fair price provisions and some control share acquisi-
tion statutes. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.0902(11), 607.1302(1)(c) (West Supp. 1992); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-11, 23-1-44-8(a)(4) (Bums 1989); MD. CORPS. & AWS'NS CODE ANN.
§§ 3-601, 603, 708 (Supp. 1991); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1799 (West 1990).
301. ROBERT C. CLARK, CoRpoRATE LAW § 13.6, 574-75 (1986); Susanne S. Dawson et.
al., Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 Bus. LAW. 423, 424 (1987).
302. GILsoN, supra note 138, at 637-39; Virginia G. Goelz, Internal Transfers of Control
Under Poison Pill Preferred Issuances to Shareholder: Toward A Shareholder Approval Rule, 60
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 94 (1985).
303. Booth, supra note 180, at 1663-66.
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(c) Cyanide Capsules
A cyanide capsule is a default provision included in a loan agree-
ment that a transfer of control triggers. At first blush this provision may
appear indistinguishable from a provision providing debtholders the right
to vote on control changes, which would require a shareholders' vote for
the reasons given in section V B(3). The cyanide capsule, however, does
not permit the debtholder both to invoke the default provision and to
remain a debtholder of the corporation. The provision is essentially an
exit option, which increases the cost to the bidder of acquiring the corpo-
ration. Accordingly, it is similar in operation to the right of redemption
or poison pill and would be treated in the same way.
(d) Golden Parachute
A golden parachute is executive compensation triggered by a change
of control. This provision does not affect control through voice mecha-
nisms, but, like redemption rights, poison pills, and cyanide capsules,
makes a change of control through exit more costly. Like these provi-
sions, expanding the concept of control to include the exit decision would
require a shareholders' vote on this type of compensation.
(ii) Business Decisions that are Outside the Normal Course of
Business and are Made When a Tender Offer is Imminent or
Pending and that are Outside the Ordinary Course
of Business
(a) Certain Repurchases of Voting Securities; Greenmail
Like certain stock issuances, certain share repurchases shift control
with respect to the exercise of voice from shareholders to managers and,
therefore, fall within a control voting system that focuses on voice.
These repurchases consist of repurchases of "control shares" from a per-
son or group (greenmail) and repurchases that reduce the amount of out-
standing shares so that shares owned by management and "friendly"
persons become "control shares." 3
However, other repurchases, such as a public self-tender by a target
corporation to defend itself from a pending tender offer or a repurchase
of less than a control block from a potential bidder (greenmail), make a
change of control through exit less likely. These repurchases affect the
exit decision and, therefore, fall within the more expanded concept of
control.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 284-85, 290-91.
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(b) Defensive Acquisitions
A target corporation may make a defensive acquisition. This acqui-
sition may cause the corporation to use its excess cash, to increase its
liabilities, or to create antitrust problems for the bidder. This defensive
tactic decreases the likelihood of a change of control through exit. Like
other defensive maneuvers discussed in this section, it does not affect the
exercise of voice.
(c) Crown Jewels
In order to induce a white knight to acquire the target corporation,
the target corporation may grant to the white knight an option to buy a
valuable asset (crown jewel), which will make the corporation less attrac-
tive to another bidder. The granting of the crown jewel makes it more
likely that the change of control through exit will be in favor of one
bidder approved by management over another. Such a provision shifts
power from shareholders to managers with respect to changes in control
through exit.
(d) High Dividends
To prevent a change of control through exit, the corporation may
make a number of decisions, out of the ordinary course of its business,
that will make the change of control by exit less likely and possibly more
costly. These decisions include declaring substantially higher dividends
when a tender offer is pending or imminent.3 °5
b. Control over Business Decisions
Shareholders may seek additional voting rights giving them control
over additional subjects, such as the purposes of the corporation, execu-
tive compensation, whether the company should discontinue business in
South Africa, or the amount of debt the corporation should incur. How-
ever, the control voting system here envisioned extends only to changes
of control through the exercise of voice in selecting directors, and possi-
bly to changes of control at the board level through exit. A precatory
voting system such as exists under the federal proxy rules may also per-
mit voting rights in those situations. The conflict of interest voting sys-
tem discussed in section VI includes additional voting rights.
305. Professor Thomas L. Hazen has suggested that it may be advisable to condition a
shareholders vote on whether dividends substantially deplete corporate assets. Letter from
Thomas L. Hazen, Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of
Law, to Lynne L. Dallas, Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law 2 (April
16, 1990) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review Association).
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5. Summary of Comparison with Existing Law
This section compares the control voting system with current state
law. First, under the control voting system, shareholders have veto
rights with respect to certain provisions included in the corporation's ar-
ticles or bylaws. Conversely, shareholders do not have voting rights with
respect to other provisions regardless of their location. The method for
voting depends on the nature of the power shift involved and also on the
direction of the shift, which direction depends on whether a provision is
being adopted or deleted. Second, shareholders do not necessarily have
voting rights on mergers and sales of substantially all the assets. The
determination of voting rights depends on whether a change of control
by one of the four methods occurs: (1) a person or group emerges with a
controlling interest, (2) a person or group loses a controlling interest, (3)
management becomes further entrenched by a transaction affecting share
ownership, or (4) shareholder voting rights over corporate assets are di-
luted or effectively nullified. Shareholders of a constituent corporation in
a merger are entitled to a majority vote of disinterested shares if they
experience such a change of control. For a sale of assets transaction, if a
corporation has sold its assets leaving it without a significant continuing
business, the shareholders are entitled to a vote of disinterested shares if a
change of control over the transferred assets results. Third, a sharehold-
ers' vote is required to dissolve the corporation under the control voting
system because such a transaction would render shareholder voting
rights meaningless. Fourth, some defensive tactics require a sharehold-
ers' vote because they involve a change of control through the exercise of
voice. If the concept of control is expanded to exit decisions, defensive
tactics, which are triggered by a change of control or which are outside
the ordinary course of business and are adopted when a tender offer is
pending or imminent, also require a shareholders' vote.
VI. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST VOTING SYSTEM
Whereas the control voting system mandates voting on changes of
control, the conflict of interest voting system provides for voting on pro-
visions or transactions involving conflicts of interests for management or
controlling shareholders. Self-dealing transactions require voting, be-
cause management and controlling shareholders are psychologically
more inclined to depart from their fiduciary obligations or to misread
exit messages in those situations.
A. Summary of Conflict of Interest Voting System
Some of the rules developed for the control voting system apply also
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to the conflict of interest voting system. The rules developed for provi-
sions that shift control from shareholders to managers apply equally to
the conflict of interest voting system. Managers have a conflict of interest
in voting on such shift. A shift of control from shareholders to managers
requires a majority vote of disinterested shares. In addition, the rules
developed for provisions that shift control from majority to minority
shareholders and that have the additional effect of placing power in the
board of directors also apply to the conflict of interest voting system.
Because managers have a conflict of interest with respect to these provi-
sions, they require a majority vote of disinterested shares.
Moreover, the rules developed for provisions that shift power from
minority to controlling shareholders and from another coalition to share-
holders apply also to the conflict of interest voting system, because of the
controlling shareholder's conflict of interest. Thus, a shift of control
from minority to majority shareholders requires the same percentage
vote that was cast to create the current situation, and a shift of power
from another coalition to shareholders requires the consent of the other
coalition.
The rules under the control voting system that apply to provisions
that shift control from controlling to minority shareholders, and that do
not place additional power in the board of directors, do not require a
shareholders' vote under the conflict of interest voting system. Neither
managers nor controlling shareholders have a conflicting interest with
respect to the adoption of those provisions. In addition, under the con-
trol voting system, the rule that a majority vote of shares may elect or
remove directors arguably is inconsistent with the conflict of interest vot-
ing system. Because the controlling shareholder may seek a managerial
interest, a vote of disinterested shares on the election or removal of direc-
tors is initially indicated. Such a vote would require interested share-
holders to obtain the support of other shareholders, thus preventing
overreaching by interested shareholders and encouraging attention to the
interests of all shareholders. A weighted voting system that recognizes
the number of shareholders as well as the percentage of shares required
to elect or remove directors may be more appropriate, however, because
it avoids disenfranchising the controlling shareholder but at the same
time recognizes his conflict.
Some transactions that require a shareholder vote under the control
voting system do not require a vote under the conflict of interest voting
system and vice versa. For example, a transaction that changes control
will not require a shareholder vote if managers or controlling sharehold-
ers have no conflict of interest in the transaction, such as where the trans-
action shifts control to some other person or group. In addition, even
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though a transaction does not affect control, a shareholder vote may be
required under the conflict of interest voting system if managers or con-
trolling shareholders have a conflict of interest with respect to the trans-
action. Finally, a shift of control from managers to shareholders requires
a majority vote of disinterested shares.
The following section develops a definition of "conflict of interest
transactions" for voting purposes. Section C then explores arguments for
expanding the conflict of interest voting system to require voting on sub-
jects not included in that definition.
B. Defining Conflict of Interest Transactions
One could develop a definition of conflict of interest transactions
from existing state statutes and fiduciary duty cases that often apply a
higher standard of review if the court finds that the board of directors
has a conflict of interest.3 6 Nevertheless, greater precision in defining
conflicting interests is advisable when such transactions vill require a
shareholder vote because a transaction may be invalid if it proceeds with-
out a vote.307 By contrast, some uncertainty in fiduciary duty cases is not
a problem since all transactions should be able to meet the higher stan-
dard of review used in conflict of interest cases. Moreover, ambiguity in
defining conflict of interest transactions in a fiduciary duty context serves
as a deterrent to wrongdoing.
This section defines fairly precisely conflict of interest transactions
for voting purposes to provide guidance to managers in determining
which transactions require a shareholder vote. Briefly, a transaction is a
conflict of interest transaction if a director, controlling shareholder, or a
person with whom the director or controlling person has a "close," "con-
trolling," or "financial" relationship, is a party to the transaction, has a
direct financial interest in the transaction, or has a financial interest in
the other party to the transaction.308
When such a person is a party to the transaction, the transaction
306. E.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-22 (Del. 1976); Schlensky v. South
Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 275, 166 N.E.2d 793, 800 (1960).
307. Of course, legislatures may wish to provide penalties for directors who negligently fail
to obtain the vote, but permit invalidation of the transaction only after consideration of the
equities involved.
308. The definition of conflict of interest transactions proposed in this article can be com-
pared and contrasted with other definitions of such transactions used in fiduciary duty cases
and for disclosure purposes. The ALI DRAFT, supra note 235, §§ 1.02, 1.18, provides a defini-
tion of conflicts for determining the standard of review for fiduciary duty claims. In connec-
tion with the solicitation of proxies, the Securities and Exchange Commission has required the
disclosure of conflicts of interest of director nominees. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404
(1991) [hereinafter Commission Rule].
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involves a conflict of interest. A state may wish, however, to limit the
scope of voting to transactions where the degree of conflict is high. One
may measure the level of conflict by the percentage or dollar amount of
the person's gross income or assets involved in or to be derived from the
transaction ("the one factor income or asset test"). The percentage or
dollar amount fixed may vary depending on whether the person involved
as a party is the director or controlling shareholder, or is a person with a
close, controlling, or financial relationship with the director or control-
ling shareholder.3"9
When the person involved has a direct financial interest in the trans-
action, a conflict of interest exists. The seriousness of the person's con-
flict of interest may determine the scope of voting. The one factor
income or asset test, which the percentage or dollar amount of the per-
son's gross income or assets involved in or to be derived from the trans-
action, can be used in determining the extent of the conflict. Again, the
percentage or dollar amount fixed may depend on whether the person
who has the direct financial interest is the director or controlling share-
holder or a person with a close, controlling, or financial relationship with
the director or controlling shareholder.
A conflict of interest transaction also includes a transaction in which
the person has a financial interest in the other party or an affiliate of the
other party to the transaction. The financial interest may derive from
various relationships, such as employee, partner, shareholder, director,
or creditor. The degree of conflict involved may limit the scope of con-
flicts voting. Determining the degree of conflict depends on three factors:
(1) the extent of the person's interest in the other party or its affiliate, (2)
the significance of the interest to the person, and (3) the importance of
the transaction to the other party or its affiliate. A degree of conflict test
would consider the percentage or dollar amount of the interest in the
other party (or its affiliate), the percentage or amount of the person's
income or assets derived from or invested in the other party (or its affili-
ate), and the percentage or dollar amount of the other party's (or its
affiliate's) income or assets involved in the transaction (the "three-factor
income or asset test").
For example, one may define a conflict of interest transaction as a
transaction where the person owns or receives at least one percent of the
309. The ALI DRAFT, supra note 235, and the Commission Rule, supra note 308, apply
also to transactions in which the corporation and a director or controlling shareholder are
parties, except that the Commission Rule applies only to shareholders' owning more than five
percent of the corporation's voting securities and to transactions involving more than $60,000.
Neither definition places importance on the significance of the transaction to the director or
shareholder involved as a party, as does the income or gross assets test outlined above.
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income or assets of the other party (or its affiliate), where the person
derives at least ten percent of his income or invests at least ten percent of
his total assets in the other party (or its affiliate), and where the other
party (or its affiliate) obtains at least five percent of its gross income or
invests at least five percent of its total assets in the transaction. These
numbers may vary depending on whether the person is the director or
controlling shareholder, or a person with a close, controlling, or financial
relationship with the director or controlling person.31
One may define a person with a close relationship with the director
or controlling person as follows:
(i) The spouse (or a parent or sibling thereof) of the director or
controlling shareholder, or a child, grandchild, sibling, parent
(or spouse of any thereof) of the director or controlling share-
holder, or an individual having the same home as the director
or controlling shareholder, or an individual for whom the di-
rector or controlling shareholder has financial responsibility
[measured by a percentage of the director or shareholder's in-
come or assets], or a trust or estate of which an individual spec-
ified in this clause (i) is a ten percent or more beneficial owner;
or (ii) a trust, estate, incompetent, conservatee, or minor of
which the director or controlling shareholder is a fiduciary.3 11
310. The ALI DRAFT, supra note 235, is less precise in defining what constitutes a person's
interest in the other party and does not take into account all three factors. See id. § 1.18.
According to the ALI Draft, a director with a financial interest or 10% equity interest in the
other party to the transaction has a conflict of interest if the interest is sufficiently substantial
that it could reasonably be expected to affect the director's judgment. Id The ALI Draft
considers the first factor and also appears to focus on the second factor, that is, the significance
of the interest to the director. The third factor, the importance of the transaction to the other
party to the transaction, however, is not taken into account.
In addition, the ALIDraft would exclude from its definition of interests in the other party
to the transaction the interest of a director or general manager; the Commission's Rule does
not apply to a directorate interest in the other party. Id The conflicts formula suggested
above would not necessarily exclude such interests, although in many cases the financial inter-
ests of directors would not satisfy the formula.
The Commission focuses on all three factors when it generally defines materiality. Com-
mission Rule, supra note 308, § 404(a) (Instruction to Paragraph (a) of Item 404). Specifically,
it focuses on the first factor in an indirect manner when it excludes from the definition of
materiality less than 10% limited partnership or equity interests in the other party to the
transaction. Id § 229.404(a) (Instruction 8A(ii) and 811). Moreover, it focuses on the third
factor when it requires the disclosure of a more than 10% equity interest or position as an
executive officer of the other party to the transaction if the transaction involves over five per-
cent of the consolidated revenues of the other party. Id § 229.404(b). The Commission also
focuses on a fourth factor, the size of the transaction, which is one measure of the risk of loss
to the corporation of entering into the transaction, by requiring the disclosure of certain inter-
ests if more than five percent of consolidated revenue of the corporation is involved in the
transaction. Id. § 229.404(b).
311. This definition is similar to Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 8.60(3), except
that a close relationship is deemed to exist with an individual for whom the director or control-
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A person with a controlling relationship with the director or con-
trolling shareholder is a person who controls or is controlled by, or is
under common control with the director or controlling shareholder.
More specific definitions of these persons are possible. One can define a
person who has a financial relationship with the director or controlling
person as a person who is the source of or the investment vehicle for a
certain percentage or dollar amount of the director or controlling share-
holder's income or assets.312
C. Arguments for Including Additional Transactions in the Conflict of
Interest Voting System
Support for expanding the subjects on which shareholders can vote
under the conflict of interest voting system exists in Professor Gilson's
article discussed above, in which he argued that managers are more likely
to act in their interest and against the interests of shareholders when they
will not be subject to the discipline of the market after the transaction
(the final period).313 This argument suggests there should be shareholder
voting on transactions that result in management or the controlling
shareholder "losing" control as well as on corporate dissolution and
some sale of asset transactions that leave the corporation with an insig-
nificant continuing business.
Professor Eisenberg has argued that all "structural" changes, even if
they do not result in a loss of control, present conflict of interest
problems for managers because they involve nonfinancial incentives and
values, such as concern for personal power and prestige, personal identi-
ling shareholder has financial responsibility. The definition applies to controlling shareholders,
and a close relationship is deemed to exist with a trust or estate of one of the individuals
specified in clause (i) in which that individual has a beneficial ownership interest of ten percent
or more (rather than an ambiguous "substantial interest"). Rnv. MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
Acr § 8.60(3) (1984). In addition, the definition of immediate family members is consistent
with the Commission's Rule which, unlike theALIDraft, specifically lists "in-laws." It adopts
the ALI Draft's inclusion of a person for whom a director or shareholder has financial respon-
sibility, but does not require the difficult assessment of whether the financial responsibility is
sufficiently substantial to be reasonably expected to affect the director or shareholder's judg-
ment adverse to the corporation. In addition, it does not include, as does the ALl Draft, more
remote familial relationships that have the same degree of intimacy, relationships not based on
consanguinity, or a legally established matrimonial relationship. These relationships, however,
would most likely be covered by including an individual having the same home as the director
or controlling shareholder.
312. The ALI Draft covers transactions in which a person has a pecuniary interest (i.e., has
a business relationship with a director or owns more than 10% of the equity interest in the
corporation) only if such interest is deemed sufficiently substantial that it would reasonably be
expected to affect the director's judgment. ALI DRAFr, supra note 235, § 1.18. The Commis-
sion Rule does not expressly address them.
313. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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fication with the corporation, and a desire for security.314 For example,
managers may have nonfinancial incentives when they approve corporate
acquisitions that do not result in a change of control.
Nonfinancial incentives are also involved in certain managerial deci-
sions that Professor Eisenberg does not classify as "structural." For ex-
ample, a low debt to equity ratio can enhance management's sense of
security, as Professor Donaldson has noted.315 Moreover, the use of
earnings for investments rather than for dividends can fuel the growth of
the corporation, thus satisfying management's desire for personal power
and prestige. Tender offers by bidding firms may be motivated in many
cases by hubris.3" 6 Decisions to expand the purposes of the corporation
or extend its duration likewise may involve nonfinancial incentives.
A legislature could require a shareholder vote on transactions that,
on average, are shown not to benefit shareholders and that satisfy plausi-
ble, personal, nonfinancial values of managers, such as power and secur-
ity. For example, if the evidence concerning the benefits to shareholders
of mergers is somewhat mixed,317 the legislature could require a share-
holder vote on all mergers even though a loss of control or conflict of
interest (as defined in the preceding section) is not involved. Moreover, a
vote on dividends may be appropriate if the return on retained earnings is
found to be significantly lower than the return on funds obtained through
debt and equity financing. In addition, a legislature may conclude from
evidence of returns from tender offers31 that shareholders of the bidding
corporation should have the right to vote on the bid.319 Of course, one
can argue that such a right for bidding company shareholders falls
outside the scope of voting because it reduces substantially managerial
accountability by interfering with the market for corporate control.
Defensive tactics that affect the exercise of exit rather than voice fall
more easily into the conflict of interest voting system than the control
voting system. Managers have a conflict of interest when voting on such
tactics. Their conflict of interest is not dependent on their subjective pur-
pose or intent in adopting the tactic,320 but on the objective fact that they
314. EISENBERG, supra note 66, at 30-36.
315. GORDON DONALDSON, MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH 54-56 (1984).
316. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986).
317. See Lyman Johnson, Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for
New Judicial Analysis of State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 183, 204-06
(1986).
318. Coffee, supra note 141, at 938.
319. Such a right has been proposed by Arthur J. Goldberg. SEC ADVISORY REPORT,
supra note 84, at 130 (Separate Statement of Aruthur J. Goldberg).
320. Thus, the problem of determining subjective intent or motive discussed by Professor
Gilson can be avoided. Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 139, at 827-30.
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may be more easily replaced without such tactics. Management's conflict
of interest is most evident (1) when the decision or transaction is condi-
tioned on a change of control, or (2) when the decision or transaction is
outside the ordinary course of business and is adopted when a tender
offer is imminent or pending. Section V B(4)(a) described both tactics.
Finally, a state legislature could conclude that nonfinancial conflicts
of interest are present to a heightened degree in certain transactions and,
therefore, require a shareholder vote. For example, a transaction where
the director or controlling shareholder is a director of the other party to
the transaction might present such a case. Such a director rarely would
satisfy the financial interest test included in the last section. A legisla-
ture, however, could conclude that a director or controlling person's ego
plays so large a part in causing such transactions that it requires a share-
holder vote.
D. Comparing the Conflict of Interest Voting System
One may summarize the conflict of interest voting system by com-
paring it with the control voting system and existing state law. First, as
under the control voting system, whether a shareholder vote is required
depends on the effects of the addition or deletion of a provision in the
corporation's articles or bylaws, as does the identification of the proper
voting method. The location of a provision, whether in the corporation's
articles or bylaws, is irrelevant to this issue. Unlike the control voting
system, however, only shifts of control with respect to which manage-
ment or controlling shareholders have a conflict of interest require a
shareholder vote.
A second dissimilarity between the two systems is that directors are
elected or removed under the conflict of interest system in accordance
with a weighted voting system that takes into account the number of
shareholders as well as percentage of shares voting.
Third, transactions, including mergers and sale-of-asset transac-
tions, that require a majority vote of disinterested shares consist of those
in which a director, controlling shareholder, or a person with whom the
director or controlling person has a close, controlling, or financial rela-
tionship, is a party to the transaction, has a direct financial interest in the
transaction, or has an interest in the other party to the transaction.
Mergers between parent companies and subsidiaries, for example, require
a majority vote of disinterested shares. Golden parachutes or other
forms of executive compensation, if they meet the financial-interest test
heretofore proposed, also require such a vote.
Fourth, if a state adheres to Professor Gilson's final period analysis,
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it would require a majority vote of disinterested shares for dissolutions
and certain sale of asset transactions that leave the corporation without a
significant continuing business.
Finally, decisions or transactions triggered by a change of control or
decided when a tender offer is pending or imminent and that are outside
the ordinary course of business require such a vote. Sixth, a legislature
could conclude that personal, nonfinancial incentives of managers impact
a number of transactions, based on evidence that, on average, these trans-
actions do not necessarily benefit shareholders. Approval here would re-
quire a majority vote of disinterested shares.
E. Risk of Loss Limitations
Rules measuring the degree of conflict do not take into account the
importance of the transaction to the subject corporation, although they
attempt to measure the likelihood that management will make decisions
not in the interest of shareholders. State legislatures may wish to add a
risk-of-loss threshold test to the conflict of interest voting scheme. Dif-
ferent thresholds might be used for situations where interests are direct
and where they are indirect (in the other party to the transaction), possi-
bly using a $60,000 threshold for transactions in which interests are di-
rect and a percentage or dollar amount of the corporation's income or
assets for transactions in which the interests are indirect.
VII. CONCLUSION
For some time, scholars have recognized the need to rework state
law governing shareholder voting rights. Modifications of state statutes
to cover transactions functionally equivalent to mergers reflect patch-
work efforts in this area. 2' One can see signs of more endemic changes
in recent revisions of state statutes 22 and in the ALI Draft proposal, 23
both of which focus on control. Moreover, attention given by courts324
and statutory provisions325 to disinterested share voting, and congres-
sional and Securities and Exchange Commission proposals for voting
rights on defensive tactics,3 1 are further indications of changing concep-
tions of voting and methods for voting.
This Article attempts to develop conceptual frameworks that en-
321. GILsON, supra note 138, at 572-73.
322. See supra text accompanying notes 231-34.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 235-44.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 245-46.
325. See supra notes 78-79.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 83-93.
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compass these developments and suggests bases for reworking share-
holder voting rights. Because corporations are powerful political,
economic, and social institutions, an effective system of checks and bal-
ances is necessary for managerial accountability to shareholders and the
public at large. For this reason, the ALI project and the ABA Commit-
tee on Corporate Laws should examine the control and conflict of inter-
est voting systems developed in this Article for the purpose of proposing
to state legislatures the revision of shareholder voting rights.
